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Toward Genuine Tribal Consultation in the 21st Century
Abstract
The tribal right to consultation requires the federal government to consult with Indian tribes prior to the
approval of any federal project, regulation, or agency policy. This article, which provides the first
comprehensive analysis of this right, highlights the current inconsistencies in interpretation and application of
the consultation duty. It then attempts to provide suggestions for changes that can be implemented by the
legislative, executive or judicial branches.
In Part I, we provide a brief overview of the development of the trust responsibility and explain how it came to
include three substantive duties: to provide services to tribal members, to protect tribal sovereignty, and to
protect tribal resources. In Part II, we offer the first detailed explanation of how the trust responsibility
developed the procedural duty to consult with Indian tribes. In this section we also discuss recent attempts by
the Obama Administration to reform the federal government’s consultation duty. In Part III, we analyze the
consultation policies that have been developed by federal agencies. In doing so, we identify four flaws that
have prevented these policies from being truly effective: lack of enforceability, specificity, uniformity, and
substantive constraints. Finally, in Part IV we present our proposal for reforming the consultation duty
through legislation, and offer suggestions that can be implemented by the judicial and executive branches in
the interim.
Keywords
right to consultation, tribal law, Indian law, Administrative Law, Natural Resources Law
Disciplines
Administrative Law | Indian and Aboriginal Law
Comments
This article is co-authored by Jeffrey K. Holth.
This article is available at Mitchell Hamline Open Access: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/254
33129-m
re_46-2 S
heet N
o. 40 S
ide A
      03/21/2013   10:43:50
33129-mre_46-2 Sheet No. 40 Side A      03/21/2013   10:43:50
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MRE\46-2\MRE202.txt unknown Seq: 1 18-MAR-13 12:34
TOWARD GENUINE TRIBAL CONSULTATION IN THE 21ST
CENTURY
Colette Routel* and Jeffrey Holth**
The federal government’s duty to consult with Indian tribes has been the subject of
numerous executive orders and directives from past and current U.S. Presidents,
which have, in turn, resulted in the proliferation of agency-specific consultation
policies. However, there is still no agreement regarding the fundamental compo-
nents of the consultation duty. When does the consultation duty arise? And what
does it require of the federal government?
The answers to these questions lie in the realization that the tribal consultation
duty arises from the common law trust responsibility to Indian tribes, which com-
pels the United States to protect tribal sovereignty and tribal resources, as well as to
provide certain services to tribal members. In that respect, the federal government’s
duty to consult with Indian tribes has a unique foundation that distinguishes it
from decisions to consult with State governments or encourage public participation
through the Administrative Procedures Act.
This Article argues that the duty to consult with Indian tribes is properly viewed as
a procedural component of the trust responsibility. It futher argues that a more
robust, judicially enforceable consultation requirement would be the most effective
way to ensure that the federal government fulfills the substantive components of its
trust responsibility to Indian tribes, while avoiding the difficult line-drawing that
would be inherent in direct enforcement of those components. In this way, the con-
sultation duty could become a powerful tool to ensure that federal agencies know
and consider the impacts their actions will have on Indian people,before those ac-
tions are taken.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418 R
I. THE FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420 R
A. The Cherokee Cases: A Sovereign-Protectorate
Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421 R
B. Kagama and Lone Wolf: The Guardian-Ward
Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426 R
C. The Modern Trust Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429 R
* Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. J.D., 2001, magna cum
laude, Order of the Coif, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Michigan; B.M., 1998,
magna cum laude, Ithaca College, Ithaca, New York. The authors would like to thank
Professors Sarah Deer, Matthew Fletcher, Eve Brensike Primus, and Kevin Washburn for
their comments on earlier drafts of this article.
** Law Clerk to Justice Alan C. Page of the Minnesota Supreme Court. J.D., 2012,
summa cum laude, William Mitchell College of Law, Saint Paul, Minnesota; B.A., 2006, Phi Beta
Kappa, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
417
33129-m
re_46-2 S
heet N
o. 40 S
ide B
      03/21/2013   10:43:50
33129-mre_46-2 Sheet No. 40 Side B      03/21/2013   10:43:50
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MRE\46-2\MRE202.txt unknown Seq: 2 18-MAR-13 12:34
418 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 46:2
II. FEDERAL-TRIBAL CONSULTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435 R
A. Development of the Consultation Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436 R
1. Consultation and the Duty to Provide
Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436 R
2. Consultation and the Duty to Protect Tribal
Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439 R
3. Clinton’s Executive Orders and Across-the-
Board Consultation Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . 442 R
B. Recent Attempts to Reform the Consultation Right . . . . . 444 R
III. LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING CONSULTATION POLICIES . . . . 448 R
A. Enforceability Issues for the Procedural Right to
Consultation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448 R
B. Lack of Specificity for Procedural Requirements . . . . . . . 453 R
1. Of What Does Consultation Consist? . . . . . . . . . 453 R
2. With Whom Must Consultation Occur? . . . . . . 458 R
3. When Should Consultation Occur? . . . . . . . . . . 461 R
4. How Will the Tribe Be Informed of
Consultation Sessions? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462 R
C. Lack of Uniformity and Volume of Consultations . . . . . 463 R
D. Enforceability Issues for Substantive Rights . . . . . . . . . . . 464 R
IV. OUR PROPOSAL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466 R
A. Enforceability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467 R
B. Alleviating Timing Concerns for Federal Projects . . . . . . 469 R
C. Specificity and Uniformity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473 R
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474 R
INTRODUCTION
One of the foundational principles of Indian law is that the
federal government has a trust responsibility to Indian tribes. This
doctrine has its origin in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, where Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall described Indian tribes as being “in a state of
pupilage” with “[t]heir relation to the United States resembl[ing]
that of a ward to his guardian.”1 The contours of this trust responsi-
bility, however, have changed dramatically over the past 180 years.
In the late 1800s, the trust responsibility was used to justify congres-
sional plenary power over Indian affairs.2 Today, it imposes certain
substantive duties on the federal government, including the duty to
provide services to tribal members (e.g., healthcare and education),
1. 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
2. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375, 383–84 (1886).
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the duty to protect tribal sovereignty, and the duty to protect tribal
resources.3 A robust body of scholarship has already addressed
many issues surrounding these substantive components.4
Interestingly, an important procedural component of the trust
responsibility—the federal duty to consult with Indian tribes—has
been virtually ignored by scholars. This consultation duty is neces-
sary to effectuate the substantive components of the trust responsi-
bility. For instance, without consultation, the federal government
might not know the locations of Indian sacred sites; therefore, a
federally approved pipeline project could inadvertently destroy
those sites5 in violation of the federal government’s duty to protect
tribal resources. Similarly, without consultation, federal officials
may not know whether diabetes-prevention or smoking-cessation ef-
forts are most needed in a particular tribal community, making it
impossible to fulfill the government’s duty to provide services given
the resource constraints imposed by Congress.
The importance of this procedural right to consultation has been
recognized by both the legislative and executive branches in recent
years. Congress has passed several statutes that explicitly require
federal agencies to consult with Indian tribes.6 Presidents William
Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama have issued executive
orders and memoranda that require executive branch agencies to
3. See infra Part I.C.
4. Most of the scholarly debate has focused on whether, in an era that encourages
tribal self-determination, the federal government should still be “protecting” tribal resources
by exercising approval authority over an Indian tribe’s resource management decisions. See,
e.g., Reid Peyton Chambers & Monroe E. Price, Regulating Sovereignty: Secretarial Discretion and
the Leasing of Indian Lands, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1061 (1974); Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the
Legacy of Conquest: A Vision for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77 (1993)
[hereinafter Clinton, Legacy of Conquest]; Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 317 (2006); Stacey L. Leeds, Moving Toward Exclusive Tribal Auton-
omy over Lands and Natural Resources, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 439 (2006); Mary Christina Wood,
Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting
Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 109.
5. See Carol Berry, Pipeline Creates Tribal Dissent, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Sept. 27,
2010), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ictarchives/2010/09/27/pipeline-
creates-tribal-dissent-81747 (questioning the adequacy of consultation before federal govern-
ment’s approval of the Ruby Pipeline Project, which destroyed sacred sites in Nevada and
Oregon); Rob Capriccioso, House Passes Keystone XL Pipeline Provision, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY
(Dec. 14, 2011), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/12/14/house-passes-
keystone-xl-pipeline-provision-67568 (“The Obama administration decided last month to de-
lay approval of the [Keystone] pipeline after vast protests from Indians and others who said
the project would harm public health as well as endanger tribal culture and lands. Tribes
have also expressed concern over lack of consultation.”).
6. See infra Part II.A.2.
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consult with Indian tribes.7 Finally, federal agencies have promul-
gated regulations and crafted policies and procedures that recog-
nize the right to federal-tribal consultation.8
Despite all of this activity, there is no consensus regarding the
nature of the components of the consultation duty. In fact, federal
agencies even have differing views about what “consultation”
means.9 Does it simply require notification of and the ability to
comment on any federal actions that may impact tribes? Or does it
require meaningful dialogue between federal and tribal officials?
This article highlights current inconsistencies in the interpretation
and application of the consultation duty. It then provides sugges-
tions for changes that can be implemented by the legislative, execu-
tive, or judicial branches.
In Part I, we provide a brief overview of the development of the
trust responsibility and explain how it came to include three sub-
stantive duties: to provide services to tribal members, to protect tri-
bal sovereignty, and to protect tribal resources. In Part II, we offer
the first detailed explanation of how the procedural duty to consult
with Indian tribes developed from the trust responsibility, and dis-
cuss recent attempts by the Obama Administration to reform the
federal government’s consultation duty. In Part III, we analyze the
consultation policies that have been developed by federal agencies.
In doing so, we identify four flaws that have prevented these poli-
cies from being truly effective—namely, a lack of enforceability,
specificity, uniformity, and substantive constraints. Finally, in Part
IV, we present our proposal for reforming the consultation duty
through legislation and offer suggestions that can be implemented
by the judicial and executive branches before such legislative
changes are enacted.
I. THE FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY
During treaty negotiations and informal meetings with federal
officials in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Indian tribes
often referred to the President of the United States as “the Great
Father.” The Great Father metaphor was used to convey the Indi-
ans’ belief that the United States possessed familial-like obligations
7. See infra Parts II.A.3 & II.B.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.B.1.
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to provide them with protection and economic support.10 Federal
officials misinterpreted this metaphor, believing it to be an ac-
knowledgement of white superiority and power.11 In a series of
cases spanning more than one hundred years, federal courts
vacillated between these two disparate visions of the federal-tribal
relationship before ultimately combining them into a doctrine that
has been variously characterized as a guardian-ward relationship, a
fiduciary relationship, or the federal trust responsibility.12
Today, the federal trust responsibility is part common law and
part statutory law. It obligates13 the federal government to provide
certain services to tribal members; it is the historical origin of con-
gressional plenary power over Indian affairs;14 and it requires fed-
eral officials to protect tribal resources and tribal sovereignty.15
Because this trust responsibility is the foundation of the federal
government’s consultation duty to Indian tribes,16 a brief summary
of its development follows.
A. The Cherokee Cases: A Sovereign-Protectorate Relationship
The federal trust responsibility began as a creature of common
law, and was first articulated by Chief Justice John Marshall in his
10. Indian tribes commonly used familial terms as metaphors to describe the relation-
ships they had with other tribes. For example, the Lenni Lenape (Delaware) tribe was re-
ferred to as “grandfather” by other Algonkian tribes, a term of great respect that was given in
recognition of the tribe’s peacekeeping ability. C.A. WESLAGER, THE DELAWARE INDIANS: A
HISTORY 8 (1972); see also Robert B. Porter, Building a New Longhouse: The Case for Government
Reform Within the Six Nations of the Haudenosaunee, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 805–08, nn.3–7 (1998)
(noting that within the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) Confederacy, the Mohawk, Onondaga,
and Seneca were referred to as “Older Brother,” while the Oneida and Cayuga were the
“Younger Brothers”).
11. See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FED-
ERAL SYSTEM 1–2 (5th ed. 2007); 1 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS xxviii (1984).
12. See, e.g., United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 473–74, 477
(2003) (variously describing the federal government’s obligation to tribes as a “fiduciary
duty,” “fiduciary relationship,” and “trust relationship”); Seminole Nation v. United States,
316 U.S. 286, 295–98 (1942) (casting the federal government’s relationship with tribes as a
“fiduciary duty,” “fiduciary obligation,” and “distinctive obligation of trust”); United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886) (“Indian tribes are the wards of the nation.”).
13. This is not to say that the “obligations” under the trust responsibility are rigid. Al-
though the federal government is legally obligated to adhere to its responsibility, it also de-
fines the obligations that comprise the responsibility.
14. See infra Part I.B.
15. See infra Part I.C.
16. See infra Part II.
33129-m
re_46-2 S
heet N
o. 42 S
ide B
      03/21/2013   10:43:50
33129-mre_46-2 Sheet No. 42 Side B      03/21/2013   10:43:50
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MRE\46-2\MRE202.txt unknown Seq: 6 18-MAR-13 12:34
422 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 46:2
1831 decision in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.17 The Cherokee Nation
filed suit under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court18
seeking to enjoin enforcement of certain recently enacted Georgia
statutes.19 Those statutes purported to annul the laws of the Chero-
kee Nation, confiscate Cherokee lands guaranteed by treaties with
the United States, and extend Georgia laws over all persons resid-
ing on those lands.20
The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the case, holding
instead that it lacked original jurisdiction because the tribe was not
a “foreign state” within the meaning of Article III of the U.S. Consti-
tution.21 In reaching this decision, Chief Justice Marshall agreed
with the Cherokees’ contention that they were a “state” in the sense
of being “a distinct political society, separated from others, capable
of managing its own affairs and governing itself.”22 After all, they
had entered into several treaties with the United States, and these
treaties, along with their implementing legislation, were an undeni-
able acknowledgment of Cherokee sovereignty.23 Even so, the
Court refused to characterize Indian tribes as “foreign.”24
The Cherokee Nation argued that since they were a state com-
posed of non-U.S. citizens, they must be a foreign state within the
meaning of the Constitution.25 While Marshall found this argument
17. 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). Chief Justice Marshall was likely influenced by the writings of
Francisco de Vitoria, a Spanish cleric and professor of theology at the University of Sala-
manca, Spain. Unlike many during his time, Vitoria believed that Indians were entitled to the
same rights enjoyed by other humans, and that Indian tribes were sovereign, self-governing
entities. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 43–44 (1947) (“In
the main, [our concepts of Indian title] are to be traced to Spanish origins, and particularly
to doctrines developed by Francisco de Vitoria, the real founder of modern international
law.”); Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 31 GEO.
L. J. 1, 11–14 (1942).
18. The Cherokee Nation could not have filed its lawsuit in the lower federal courts,
because Congress did not extend federal question jurisdiction to those courts until 1875. See
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. Additionally, the Nation could not have brought its
lawsuit in Georgia courts because then-existing precedent provided that states possessed sov-
ereign immunity in proceedings before their own courts, but not in federal court proceed-
ings that involved a foreign nation. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 111–12 (5th ed. 2005); see also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414–15
(1979) (noting that under English common law, a sovereign possessed immunity from suits
in its own courts, “but each petty lord was subject to suit in the courts of a higher lord” except
for the King, for there was no higher court where he could be sued). The U.S. Supreme
Court was therefore the Cherokee Nation’s only option.
19. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 20.
22. Id. at 16.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 20.
25. Id. at 16.
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“imposing,”26 he ultimately rejected it for three reasons. First, In-
dian lands were within the geographical limits of the United
States.27 Foreign nations recognized this, and any attempt to trade
with Indian tribes would be considered an act of war.28 Second,
many Indian treaties, including treaties negotiated with the Chero-
kee Nation, acknowledged that Indian tribes were under the pro-
tection of and dependent on the United States government.29
Third, the only mention of Indian tribes in the Constitution was in
Article I, section 8, clause 3, which empowered Congress to “regu-
late commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,
and with the Indian tribes.” Chief Justice Marshall was particularly
swayed by the fact that this clause distinguished Indian tribes from
foreign nations by name.30
Rather than holding that the tribe constituted a separate foreign
state, Marshall described the federal-tribal relationship as follows:
[Indian tribes] are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to
the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.
They look to our government for protection; rely upon its
kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants;
and address the president as their great father.31
He concluded that Indian tribes were “domestic dependent na-
tions,”32 even while admitting that he was making a “peculiar and
cardinal distinction[ ] which exist[s] no where else”in domestic or
international law.33
26. Id.
27. Id. at 17 (“[I]t may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the
acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated
foreign nations.”). In an earlier case, the Court had concluded that the doctrine of discovery
vested title to lands in the discovering nation, which left the Indian inhabitants with only
aboriginal occupancy rights. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823). Following the
American Revolution, the United States became the successor in interest to the titles that
England had acquired as a discovering nation, placing Indian lands within the geographical
boundaries of the United States. See id. at 584–85.
28. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17–18.
29. Id. For example, Article III of the Treaty of Hopewell states that “[t]he said Indians
for themselves and their respective tribes and towns do acknowledge all the Cherokees to be
under the protection of the United States of America, and of no other sovereign whosoever.”
Treaty of Hopewell, U.S.-Cherokee, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18.
30. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 18–19.
31. Id. at 17.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 16.
33129-m
re_46-2 S
heet N
o. 43 S
ide B
      03/21/2013   10:43:50
33129-mre_46-2 Sheet No. 43 Side B      03/21/2013   10:43:50
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MRE\46-2\MRE202.txt unknown Seq: 8 18-MAR-13 12:34
424 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 46:2
Despite the fact that only one other Justice joined Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion in Cherokee Nation,34 a majority of the Court con-
firmed Marshall’s vision of the federal-tribal relationship just one
year later in Worcester v. Georgia.35 In Worcester, the Court overturned
the criminal convictions of two missionaries who had not obtained
a license mandated by the State of Georgia for all persons residing
in Cherokee Territory.36 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Mar-
shall held the Georgia statute unlawful under the Supremacy
Clause.37
Marshall concluded that Indian tribes “had always been consid-
ered as distinct, independent political communities retaining their
original natural rights.”38 To justify this assertion, he analyzed trea-
ties between the United States and various Indian tribes (including
the Cherokee Nation) and laws passed by Congress governing trade
with tribes.39 While many treaties acknowledged that tribes were
under the protection of the United States, Marshall acknowledged
that “[a] weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place
itself under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping
itself of the right of government, and ceasing to be a state.”40 In
fact, he compared the Cherokee’s situation to tributary and feudal
states in Europe, and he concluded by firmly stating that
[t]he Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupy-
ing its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in
which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the
citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent
of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties,
and with the acts of congress.41
34. Chief Justice Marshall was joined only by Justice McLean; Justices Johnson and Bald-
win concurred in the result, but believed that tribes possessed no sovereignty. Justice Thomp-
son, joined by Justice Story, dissented, arguing that the Cherokee Nation was a foreign state.
As a result, a majority of the Justices held that the Cherokee Nation was a state (Marshall,
McLean, Thompson, and Story), but not a foreign state (Marshall, McLean, Johnson, and
Baldwin). Id.
35. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
36. Id. at 538–39.
37. Id. at 561–62.
38. Id. at 559.
39. Id. at 549–57.
40. Id. at 561; see also id. at 555 (“This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiv-
ing the protection of one more powerful: not that of individuals abandoning their national
character, and submitting as subjects to the laws of a master.”).
41. Id. at 561.
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Cherokee Nation and Worcester have been the subject of much schol-
arly attention and have been interpreted in widely divergent ways.42
These two cases appear, however, to describe a federal-tribal rela-
tionship that is characterized by the existence of a sovereign and its
protectorate.43 The Court recognized that Indian tribes were
“states” as that term is used in international law, and that they pos-
sessed exclusive sovereignty within their territory.44 Their depen-
dent status was actually a source of Indian rights.45 The United
States, according to the Court, had a duty to protect tribes from
foreign nations, from U.S. states attempting to exert sovereignty
over Indian country, and from U.S. citizens who wanted to take
their land.46
42. Many scholars have argued that Cherokee Nation, among other early cases, enshrined
racism and colonialism in federal Indian law. See, e.g., Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina
and the Legislation That Overturned It: A Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 767, 789–91 (1993); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard
Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV.
219, 255–57. Yet others have pointed out that Court decisions in the late 1800s subverted the
unique federal-tribal relationship that Marshall developed in his cases. See, e.g., William C.
Canby, Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2–5 (1987);
Clinton, Legacy of Conquest, supra note 4, at 110–25. Marshall’s construction, by contrast, was R
very protective of tribal sovereignty. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present:
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381,
390–406 (1993).
43. See Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indi-
ans, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1219 & n.34, 1220 (1975); see also Mary Christina Wood, Indian
Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471,
1498 & n.124 (characterizing the federal-tribal relationship articulated by Marshall as a “sov-
ereign trusteeship”).
44. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 547 (1832) (“[O]ur history furnishes no exam-
ple . . . of any attempt on the part of the crown to interfere with the internal affairs of the
Indians, farther than to keep out the agents of foreign powers, who, as traders or otherwise,
might seduce them into foreign alliances.”); id. at 557 (describing Indian tribes as “distinct
political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is
exclusive”).
45. Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055,
1167–68 n.328 (1995).
46. Marshall’s approach had seemingly been sanctioned by Congress in the Trade and
Intercourse Acts, which prohibited non-Indians from entering Indian territories without per-
mission, provided for the removal of intruders, and denied non-Indians and local govern-
ments the right to purchase Indian lands. See, e.g., Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729;
Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137. These Acts were all framed as prohibitions and
restraints against non-Indians, not assertions of power over Indians. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA,
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS: THE INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS
1790–1834, at 48 (1962).
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B. Kagama and Lone Wolf: The Guardian-Ward Relationship
The position of Indian tribes vis-à-vis the federal government
changed dramatically in the fifty years following Cherokee Nation and
Worcester. In the 1840s, Congress approved the annexation of Texas,
a treaty with the British resulted in acquisition of the Oregon Terri-
tory, and the Mexican-American War ended with the United States’
purchase of most of the Southwest in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hi-
dalgo.47 U.S. citizens flooded the west to settle this newly available
land, destroying large numbers of bison and other game that tribes
relied upon for sustenance.48 Tribes were forced to cede more and
more of their land to make way for settlers. With less territory and
diminishing game, many tribes lost the ability to support them-
selves. As a result, treaty annuities became the primary means of
Indian subsistence.49
With the power and territory of Indian tribes diminished, many
federal officials began viewing tribal sovereignty as a fiction created
by the federal government to make land acquisitions easier.50 In
1871, Congress put an end to treaty making with Indian tribes51 and
47. Act of Mar. 1, 1845, 5 Stat. 797 (annexing Texas to the United States); Act of Aug.
14, 1838, ch. 177, 9 Stat. 323 (organizing the Oregon Territory); Treaty with Great Britain,
June 15, 1846, 9 Stat. 869; PRUCHA, supra note 11, at 316. The Oregon Territory encompassed R
an area that today includes the states of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and parts of Montana
and Wyoming. In the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mexico ceded an area that now includes
all of California, Nevada and Utah, and portions of Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, and
Wyoming. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922.
48. PRUCHA, supra note 11, at 340. R
49. For many tribes, if annuity payments were not made on time, tribal members faced
starvation. See, e.g., ROY W. MEYER, HISTORY OF THE SANTEE SIOUX: UNITED STATES INDIAN
POLICY ON TRIAL 112–14 (1967) (noting that one of the causes of the Sioux Uprising of 1862
was the federal government’s failure to provide timely treaty annuities, which led to starva-
tion-like conditions for many Minnesota Dakota Indians).
50. For example, during the debate on an amendment to the Indian appropriations bill
that effectively ended treaty making with Indian tribes, California Representative Sargent
stated that Indians
are simply the wards of the Government, to whom we furnish means of existence, and
not independent nations with whom we are to treat as our equals. Ought not that fact
to be admitted? Has not the comedy of “treaties,” “potentates,” “nations,” been played
long enough? Is it not played out?
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 765 (1871).
51. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 3, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (“[H]ereafter no Indian nation or
tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an
[independent] nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty.”).
This provision is of dubious constitutionality, because it is an attempt by the Legislature to
circumscribe the treaty making power entrusted in the Executive Branch by the Constitution.
Nevertheless, no President has negotiated a treaty with an Indian tribe since 1871.
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instead began unilaterally enacting statutes to govern their “help-
less” wards, who federal officials believed were incapable of manag-
ing their own affairs. A prime example of this new perspective
towards Indian nations was Congress’s passage of a statute declaring
all contracts with Indians or Indian tribes “relative to their lands” or
“growing out of or in reference to [their] annuities” null and void
unless they had been approved by both the Commissioner of In-
dian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior.52
It was against this backdrop that the U.S. Supreme Court decided
United States v. Kagama.53 In 1885, Congress passed the Major
Crimes Act, a statute that applied federal criminal laws to certain
serious crimes committed by and against Indians within Indian
country.54 Kagama, an Indian who was charged with murdering an-
other Indian on the Hoopa Valley Reservation, argued that the Act
was unconstitutional.55 The Supreme Court agreed with Kagama’s
contention that the Indian Commerce Clause did not authorize the
creation and enforcement of federal criminal law on Indian reser-
vations, but nonetheless sustained the constitutionality of the
statute.56
The Kagama decision reflects a significant shift in how the federal
government perceived Indian tribes at the end of the nineteenth
century. Abandoning Chief Justice Marshall’s characterization of
tribes as “domestic dependent nations,” the Kagama Court now re-
ferred to tribes as “local dependent communities.”57 This was not
simply a change in vernacular. The Court now believed that Indian
tribes did not possess sovereign authority. Therefore, the operative
question was not whether Kagama’s tribe had the authority to pros-
ecute the crime, but whether the federal or the state government
52. Id. at 570–71. This statute was passed to protect Indians from falling victim to fraud-
ulent schemes. As Senator Davis told his colleagues, “[t]here are no Indians, as a tribe or as
individuals, that are competent to protect themselves against the enterprise and the fraud
and the robbery of the white man.” CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1484 (1871). These
statements were echoed by other senators who offered anecdotal evidence that Indian tribes
were being tricked into promising a large percentage of their annuities to individuals who,
although claiming to be able to assist them in presenting their grievances to Congress, were
nothing more than frauds. See id. at 1484–86 (statements of Senators Corbett, Wilson, and
Harlan).
53. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006). Before this statute, federal criminal laws had only extended
to interracial crimes in Indian country. See Indian Country Crimes Act, Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683, 757 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006)).
55. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 376.
56. Id. at 378–79.
57. Id. at 382.
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had authority to prosecute Indians for crimes committed within In-
dian country.58
The Court concluded that the federal government possessed this
power. It found support for this conclusion in the concept of the
guardian-ward relationship:
It seems to us that this is within the competency of Congress.
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are com-
munities dependent on the United States—Dependent largely
for their daily food; Dependent for their political rights. . . .
From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to
the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them
and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the
duty of protection, and with it the power.59
Subsequent cases built upon the reasoning in Kagama. The most
important was Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,60 in which the Court declared
that the power derived from the guardian-ward relationship was
“plenary,” and that its exercise produced a nonjusticiable political
question.61 As a result, the Court upheld a statute that allotted the
Kiowa and Comanche reservations to tribal members and sold the
remaining “surplus” lands without the consent of three-quarters of
those tribes’ adult male members—consent that an 1867 treaty be-
tween the United States and these tribes had required.62 The Court
reasoned that the treaty could not operate to limit Congress’s au-
thority to care for and protect Indian people.63
After Lone Wolf, Congress immediately began to change the way
that it dealt with Indian property. Commissioner of Indian Affairs
William Jones64 suggested that Congress dispose of Indian lands
without even seeking tribal consent: “Supposing you were the
guardian or ward of a child 8 or 10 years of age,” he told the House
Indian Affairs Committee, “would you ask the consent of a child as
58. See id. at 379, 381–82.
59. Id. at 383–84.
60. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
61. Id. at 565. In this context, the term “plenary” refers to a federal power that is “with-
out subject-matter limitation.” Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Con-
gress over the Indian Nations, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 418 (1988).
62. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 564.
63. See id.
64. Jones held the post of Commissioner of Indian Affairs from 1897 to 1905. FREDERICK
E. HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS, 1880–1920, at 3
(2001).
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to the investment of its funds? No; you would not.”65 Congress fol-
lowed Jones’ suggestion and, without even initiating negotiations,
proceeded to adopt allotment statutes for many Indian
reservations.66
Congress was even more aggressive when it came to Indian tim-
ber and mineral resources. Federal officials believed that Indians,
like “all primitive peoples,” were “grossly wasteful of their natural
resources.”67 To remedy this problem, in 1910 Congress gave the
Secretary of the Interior the discretionary authority to dispose of
trees on trust lands without obtaining the consent of the Indian
tribe or individual allottee on whose lands the trees grew.68 Like-
wise, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to unilater-
ally issue leases for mining gold, silver, copper, and other minerals
on tribal lands in nine Western states.69
Thus, the guardian-ward relationship that had protected tribal
sovereignty and territorial boundaries in Cherokee Nation and Worces-
ter was now significantly recast. Whereas Indian dependency had
been a source of Indian rights in Worcester, it was now the source of
unlimited federal power. All three branches of the federal govern-
ment emphasized that Indians were uncivilized and incompetent.
Indians were dependent on the federal government for food and
shelter. The federal government purported to have the power and
duty to protect Indian people not only from outsiders, but from
themselves.
C. The Modern Trust Responsibility
Due in large part to changes in congressional policy, the trust
responsibility has undergone yet another transformation in the cen-
tury after Lone Wolf. In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act (IRA),70 which abandoned the federal policy of forced
assimilation and allotment, encouraged Indian tribes to reassert
65. Id. at 155.
66. Congress allotted, among others, the Crow and Flathead Reservations in Montana,
the Spirit Lake Reservation in North Dakota, and the Wind River Reservation in Wyoming in
this manner. Id. at 156–57.
67. Id. at 167–68.
68. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 7, 36 Stat. 855, 857; see also HOXIE, supra note 64, at R
185.
69. Act of Dec. 16, 1926, ch. 12, 44 Stat. 922, 922–23; Act of June 30, 1919, ch. 4, § 26, 41
Stat. 3, 31–34.
70. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 461–479 (2006)).
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their sovereignty through the formation of constitutional govern-
ments, and sought “to get away from the bureaucratic control of the
Indian Department . . . [by giving] the Indians control over their
own affairs.”71 While the latter goal was not achieved by the IRA, it
has become the principal aim of federal policy over the past four
decades.
In 1970, in a special message to Congress, President Nixon ac-
knowledged that the federal government’s previous attempts to for-
cibly terminate Indian tribes and assimilate tribal members had
been wrong.72 He suggested that Congress finally repudiate this
policy and, in its place, adopt a legislative program within which the
“Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions.”73
While Nixon was certainly not the first federal official or even the
first President to express these sentiments, Congress was finally
ready to listen.74 The era of tribal self-determination was thus born,
and Congress began enacting legislation that turned the govern-
ance of Indian reservations over to Indian tribes.75
During this era, Congress has attempted to marry tribal self-de-
termination and the federal trust responsibility, despite the inher-
ent conflicts between these doctrines. Today, the modified trust
responsibility contains at least three different duties: (1) to provide
federal services to tribal members; (2) to protect tribal sovereignty;
and (3) to protect tribal resources.
Duty to Provide Services: The trust responsibility is the source of a
federal duty to provide governmental services to tribal members
such as health care and educational benefits.76 Indian land cessions
71. 78 CONG. REC. 11,125 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wheeler).
72. Richard M. Nixon, Special Message on Indian Affairs (July 8, 1970), in DOCUMENTS
OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 256, 257 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 2000).
73. Id.
74. See Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV.
777, 787–93 (2006) (concluding that President Johnson’s War on Poverty was the unin-
tended birthplace of the tribal self-determination movement); see also Lyndon B. Johnson,
Special Message to Congress (Mar. 6, 1968), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN
POLICY 249, 249 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 2000) (“I propose a new goal for our Indian
problems: A goal that ends the old debate about ‘termination’ of Indian programs and
stresses self-determination; a goal that erases old attitudes of paternalism and promotes part-
nership self-help.”).
75. See, e.g., infra note 80. R
76. Just as the duty of protection began as an explicit treaty right for some tribes that
was extrapolated to all tribes as part of the general common law trust responsibility, the same
holds true for the duty to provide services. For example, an 1803 treaty with the Kaskaskia
Indians provided that “[t]he United States will take the Kaskaskia tribe under their immediate
care and patronage, and will afford them a protection as effectual against the other Indian
tribes and against all other persons whatever as is enjoyed by their own citizens.” Treaty with
the Kaskaskia art. II, August 7, 1803, Stat. 78 (emphasis added). Other treaties provided that
money annuities or goods would be provided in perpetuity to the signatory tribes. See, e.g.,
33129-m
re_46-2 S
heet N
o. 47 S
ide A
      03/21/2013   10:43:50
33129-mre_46-2 Sheet No. 47 Side A      03/21/2013   10:43:50
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MRE\46-2\MRE202.txt unknown Seq: 15 18-MAR-13 12:34
WINTER 2013] Toward Genuine Tribal Consultation 431
enabled significant growth and development in the United States,
yet they diminished the ability of Indian tribes to continue their
traditional way of life. Some amount of federal care for tribal mem-
bers can therefore be implied in this exchange.77 While no court
has ever enforced this obligation,78 Congress has implicitly and ex-
plicitly recognized it through the passage of several statutes that
require that money and services be provided to Indian tribes.79 As
part of the federal government’s move towards self-determination,
Congress has transferred a substantial amount of control over the
administration of these services to Indian tribes.80
Duty to Protect Tribal Sovereignty: Early Supreme Court cases that
defined the contours of the federal-tribal relationship underscore
an important facet of the trust responsibility: In administering the
trust, the federal government has a duty to protect tribal sover-
eignty. In Cherokee Nation, Chief Justice Marshall emphasized that
tribes looked to the federal government for protection while still
acknowledging that tribes were “distinct political societ[ies].”81
Describing the federal-tribal relationship in Worcester, Marshall reit-
erated that a tribe may place itself under the protection of the more
powerful United States “without stripping itself of the right of gov-
ernment, and ceasing to be a state.”82 In this sense, the protection
of tribal nations as a part of the trust responsibility does not simply
Treaty with the Sioux art. II, Sept. 29, 1837, 7 Stat. 538, 539 (stating that the U.S. would invest
$300,000 in state stocks and pay the Dakota “annually, forever, an income of not less than five
per cent” interest on that sum); Treaty of Canandaigua art. VI, Nov. 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 44, 46
(providing that $4,500 “shall be expended yearly forever” for the Haudenosaunee (Six
Nations)).
77. Nixon, supra note 72, at 257 (“[T]he Indians have often surrendered claims to vast R
tracts of land . . . . In exchange, the government has agreed to provide community services
such as health, education and public safety . . . .”).
78. See infra Part III.D.
79. See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 701, 115 Stat.
1425, 1907 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006)) (“It is the policy of the United States to
fulfill the Federal Government’s unique and continuing trust relationship with and responsi-
bility to the Indian people for the education of Indian children.”); Snyder Act of 1921, Pub.
L. No. 67-85, 42 Stat. 208, 208–09 (codified at 25 U.S.C § 13 (2006)) (authorizing the BIA to
expend money that Congress may appropriate “for the benefit, care, and assistance of the
Indians,” including for education, health, and farming); Indian Health Care Improvement
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-437, 90 Stat. 1400, 1400 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1683
(2006) (“Federal health services to maintain and improve the health of the Indians are con-
sonant with and required by the Federal government’s historical and unique legal relation-
ship with, and resulting responsibility to, the American Indian people.”).
80. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 93-638, § 2, 88 Stat. 2203, 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450). See also Act of
Oct. 25, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250 (Amendments to the Self-Determination
Act).
81. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1831).
82. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832).
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involve protecting distinct groups of people. Rather, it is about pro-
tecting distinct political groups and the inherent aspects of sover-
eignty that they maintain within their territories.83 Indeed, as
Marshall recognized, the protection of a sovereign cannot be
successfully accomplished without protecting its underlying
sovereignty.
Just as originally conceived, the federal government still has a
duty to protect tribal sovereignty against incursions by states and
their citizens. One way in which the federal government fulfills this
duty today is by bringing lawsuits against states. Congress has au-
thorized the U.S. Attorney to represent tribes in “all suits at law and
in equity.”84 Using this statutory directive, the Department of Justice
frequently initiates or joins lawsuits designed to protect tribal sover-
eignty by, for example, preventing states from collecting taxes on
tribal members within Indian country85 or forcing states to acknowl-
edge the territorial boundaries of a tribe.86 Another way in which
the federal government protects tribal sovereignty is by taking ac-
tions designed to strengthen tribal court systems, to ensure that
they can serve as a viable alternative forum to their state and federal
counterparts. Thus, in enacting the Indian Tribal Justice Act of
83. See id. at 547. The notion that the trust responsibility includes a duty to protect tribal
sovereignty is supported by scholarship that describes the federal-tribal relationship as one of
a sovereign and a protectorate. See sources cited supra note 43. Inherent in this characteriza- R
tion is the assumption that to protect the tribe as a sovereign, the federal government must
protect the tribe’s sovereignty.
84. 25 U.S.C. § 175 (2006).
85. United States ex rel. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 105 F.3d 1552 (8th
Cir. 1997) (successfully bringing suit for declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief
against the State for wrongfully collecting motor vehicle excise taxes and registration fees
from tribal members residing on the Cheyenne River Reservation).
86. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe v. Granholm, No. 05-10296-BC, 2011 WL 1884196,
*1 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (noting that the United States intervened in the tribe’s lawsuit against
the State of Michigan, and argued that all lands within six townships in central Michigan
were part of the tribe’s treaty-created reservation and remained Indian country).
The federal government also fulfills its duty to protect tribal sovereignty by preempting
state law within Indian country. Preemption analysis is different in Indian law than it is “in a
field which the States have traditionally occupied.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947); see also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980)
(noting that “[t]he unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty” make it “treacherous to
import . . . notions of pre-emption that are properly applied to [federal enactments regulat-
ing States]”). Indian preemption is determined by balancing federal, state, and tribal inter-
ests, and this balancing test applies regardless of whether there is a federal statute on point.
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983) (holding that state game laws
could not apply to non-Indians within the boundaries of the Tribe’s reservation, because they
were preempted by federal and tribal interests).
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1993, which authorized federal financial support for tribal court sys-
tems, Congress stated that “the United States has a trust responsibil-
ity to each tribal government that includes the protection of the
sovereignty of each tribal government.”87
Today, however, tribal sovereignty is attacked not only by states
and their citizens, but also by the federal government itself. Follow-
ing judicial recognition of congressional plenary power over Indian
affairs,88 the trust responsibility has necessarily expanded to include
the duty to protect tribal sovereignty from inadvertent divestment
by Congress. Courts require clear and explicit congressional intent
before reading legislation in a way that diminishes tribal rights.89
Courts may also refuse to apply general federal laws within reserva-
tion boundaries by giving expansive effect to treaty provisions that
restrict intrusions into a tribe’s territory. For example, in an 1868
treaty with the Navajo, the United States promised “that no persons
except those herein so authorized . . . shall ever be permitted to
pass over, settle upon, or reside in, the territory described in this
article.”90 The Tenth Circuit interpreted this provision to preclude
federal employees operating under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act from inspecting tribal businesses operating solely within
the Navajo Reservation.91 A handful of decisions have prevented the
87. Indian Tribal Justice Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-176, § 2, 107 Stat. 2004, 2004
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006)) (emphasis added).
88. In recent cases, the Supreme Court has claimed that congressional plenary power is
more properly considered to be derived from the Indian Commerce Clause, the Treaty
Clause, or both, rather than the trust responsibility. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S.
193, 200 (2004). Congress’s plenary power has been tempered slightly by subsequent Su-
preme Court cases acknowledging that congressional actions are reviewable by the courts and
constrained by the Bill of Rights. United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 413 (1980)
(“[T]he idea that relations between this Nation and the Indian tribes are a political matter,
not amenable to judicial review . . . has long since been discredited in takings cases, and was
expressly laid to rest in Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks.”); Delaware Tribal Bus.
Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84–85 (1977) (applying rational-basis review when Indian-
related congressional legislation is challenged); Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States,
299 U.S. 476 (1937) (holding that the power to take Indian property and abrogate Indian
treaties is limited by the Fifth Amendment’s just-compensation requirement).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986) (“Congress’ intention to
abrogate Indian treaty rights [must] be clear and plain.”); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470
(1984) (stating that diminishment of a reservation “will not be lightly inferred” and “requires
that Congress clearly evince an ‘intent . . . to . . . change boundaries’”) (ellipsis in original)
(quoting Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 615 (1977)); Menominee Tribe of
Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968) (holding that an act terminating the tribe
did not abrogate its implied right to hunt and fish within former reservation boundaries).
90. Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prod. Indus., 692 F.2d 709, 711 (10th Cir. 1982).
91. Id. at 712.
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application of general federal laws to other Indian tribes when simi-
lar treaty provisions exist.92
Duty to Protect Tribal Resources: As discussed in Part I(B), following
Lone Wolf, the federal government began to exercise its plenary
power by unilaterally assuming control over tribal resources. Ple-
nary power over Indian affairs remains today, but the degree to
which it is utilized to control Indian resources has significantly di-
minished. For example, pursuant to statutes such as the American
Indian Agricultural Resource Management Act of 199393 and the
National Forest Resources Management Act,94 tribes usually decide
whether to lease their land, mineral, and timber resources. By giv-
ing tribes control over these initial decisions, self-determination is
advanced. Yet federal law provides that these leases are void until
approved by the federal government in its role as trustee over tribal
resources.95 These approval provisions are vestiges of the guardian-
ward relationship envisioned by Kagama and Lone Wolf, within
which the federal government paternalistically seeks to protect
tribes from entering into improvident agreements.
In those rare cases where the federal government maintains com-
plete control over tribal resources, the Supreme Court has said that
the trust responsibility requires its actions to “be judged by the most
exacting fiduciary standards.”96 For example, in United States v. White
Mountain Apache Tribe,97 the Supreme Court concluded that the
92. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937, 938 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was not applicable because its en-
forcement would “directly interfere with the Cherokee Nation’s treaty-protected right of self-
government”).
93. American Indian Agricultural Resource Management Act of 1993 (AIARMA), Pub.
L. No. 103-177, 107 Stat. 2011 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3745 (2006)). The AIARMA
explicitly states that its purpose is to “carry out the trust responsibility of the United States
and promote the self-determination of Indian tribes.” 25 U.S.C. § 3702 (2006).
94. National Indian Forest Resources Management Act (NIFRMA), Pub. L. No. 101-635,
§ 301, 104 Stat. 4532 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3120 (2006)). One of NIFRMA’s stated
purposes is to “allow the Secretary of the Interior to take part in the management of Indian
forest lands, with the participation of the lands’ beneficial owners, in a manner consistent
with the Secretary’s trust responsibility and with the objectives of the beneficial owners.” 25
U.S.C. § 3102(1) (2006).
95. 25 C.F.R. §§ 84.003, 84.008, 162.207, 163.14, 163.20 (2012).
96. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942). In Seminole Nation, the
Supreme Court held the United States liable for monetary damages when, at the request of
the Nation’s tribal council, it distributed treaty annuities directly to the tribal treasurer and
certain creditors rather than to individual tribal members. The United States knew that there
were allegations of corruption within the Nation’s government, and the money was in fact
misappropriated. Id. at 295. The Court concluded that in undertaking its guardianship over
Indian tribes, the federal government “has charged itself with moral obligations of the high-
est responsibility and trust” and its conduct “should therefore be judged by the most exacting
fiduciary standards.” Id. at 297.
97. 537 U.S. 465 (2003).
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United States could be liable for damages for not maintaining tribal
trust property. A federal statute provided that the former Fort
Apache Military Reservation was to be “held by the United States in
trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe” but that the Secretary
of the Interior could continue to use the land and improvements
for administrative or school purposes.98 The Secretary had been us-
ing more than two dozen of the reservation’s buildings but had not
been maintaining them. A study commissioned by the Tribe estab-
lished that it would cost approximately $14 million to rehabilitate
the property.99 Finding that all the elements of a common law trust
were present,100 the Court held that the federal government had
the “the fundamental common-law duties of a trustee . . . to pre-
serve and maintain trust assets” and should thus “be liable in dam-
ages for the breach of its fiduciary duties.”101
In conclusion, many of the substantive elements of the trust
responsibility that were established in Cherokee Nation, Worcester,
Kagama, and Lone Wolf remain today. The federal government pro-
vides certain services to tribes and their members, and it has a duty
to protect tribal sovereignty and resources.
II. FEDERAL-TRIBAL CONSULTATION
The trust responsibility is not limited to the substantive compo-
nents discussed in Part I. It also imposes a procedural duty on the
federal government to consult with federally recognized Indian
tribes. Meaningful consultation with federal officials is necessary to
determine what services are most needed by tribal members, to un-
derstand how federal and state actions may be encroaching on tri-
bal sovereignty, and to analyze whether a federal project will have
an adverse effect on tribal resources. While consultation should
therefore play an integral role in the federal government’s fulfill-
ment of the trust responsibility to Indian tribes, organized consulta-
tion began only recently.
In 1954, the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI)
launched an offensive to stop Congress’s then policy of terminating
Indian tribes and forcibly assimilating their members. Among other
things, NCAI’s “Declaration of Indian Rights” stated that Indian
98. Pub. L. No. 86-392, 74 Stat. 8, 8 (1960).
99. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 469.
100. The federal government was the trustee, the beneficiary was the Tribe, and the trust
corpus was the buildings comprising the Fort Apache Military Reservation, which were under
the control of the federal government. See id. at 474–75.
101. Id. at 475–76.
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tribes should be informed of and consulted about federal policies
that may affect their rights.102 While it took another fifteen years
before the federal government agreed with NCAI, today the consul-
tation duty is explicitly acknowledged in myriad executive orders,
agency policies and regulations, and congressional enactments.
A. Development of the Consultation Right
1. Consultation and the Duty to Provide Services
In his special message to Congress in 1970, President Nixon ac-
knowledged that the federal government had a duty “to provide
community services such as health, education and public safety” to
Indian people.103 He also noted that only 1.5 percent of the Depart-
ment of Interior’s programs that were directly serving Indians were
under Indian control.104 The President admonished Congress and
federal officials that “we must make it clear that Indians can be-
come independent of Federal control without being cut off from
Federal concern and support.”105
As a first step towards implementation of Nixon’s vision, the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs (BIA) began seeking ways to increase the
number of Indian employees in high-ranking agency positions.106 It
also began drafting procedures for increasing tribal participation in
the agency’s personnel decisions. In the summer of 1971, the
agency circulated a draft consultation policy to federally recognized
Indian tribes.107 After a period of comment and discussion, the re-
vised policy, entitled “Guidelines for Consultation with Tribal
Groups on Personnel Management Within the Bureau of Indian
Affairs” (1972 Guidelines), went into effect in May 1972.108
102. Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments Act: Hearing on H.R 5608
Before the H. Comm. on Natural Res., 110th Cong. 83–84 (2008) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R.
5608] (statement of the National Congress of American Indians).
103. Nixon, supra note 72, at 257. R
104. Id. at 258.
105. Id.
106. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 538, 545 (1974) (discussing the new BIA policy
adopted in June 1972, which extended the Indian Reorganization Act’s Indian-preference
mandate to include not only initial hiring decisions, but also promotions within the agency).
107. The policy is discussed and excerpted at length in Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v.
Andrus, 603 F.2d 707, 717–21 (8th Cir. 1979).
108. Id. at 717.
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The 1972 Guidelines defined consultation simply as “providing
pertinent information to and obtaining the views of tribal gov-
erning bodies.”109 They indicated that the precise parameters of tri-
bal consultation would vary depending on the circumstances, and
they suggested that the BIA negotiate agreements with individual
tribes to ensure that the parties had a “clear understanding” of the
scope and intensity of tribal consultation.110 The policy did, how-
ever, articulate some specific instances when consultation should
occur, including (1) the hiring of an Area Director or Agency Su-
perintendent; (2) recommendations on “personnel policies,
programs and procedures”; and (3) circumstances affecting overall
staffing (e.g., funding and reorganization).111
These consultation provisions were the basis for a handful of suc-
cessful lawsuits that were later brought by tribes.112 For example, in
Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, the BIA decided to transfer
the Superintendent of the Pine Ridge Agency because his brother
was elected President of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, creating a poten-
tial conflict of interest.113 The Tribe brought suit, arguing that they
had not been sufficiently consulted before the transfer order, and
the Eighth Circuit agreed. The Court held that the BIA had not
complied with the 1972 Guidelines or with the trust responsibility
more generally:
Failure of the Bureau to make any real attempt to comply with
its own policy of consultation not only violates those general
principles which govern administrative decision-making, but
also violates the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon
the Government in its dealings with these dependent and
sometimes exploited people.114
Despite these initial litigation successes, the 1972 Guidelines were
the only consultation provisions that then existed and were limited
to the BIA’s personnel issues.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 717–18.
112. In Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Deer, the District Court for the District of South Dakota
held that the reduction-in-force notices issued to six BIA employees on the Lower Brule
Reservation were void. 911 F. Supp. 395, 402 (D.S.D. 1995). Both the 1972 Guidelines and
subsequent agency pronouncements required the agency to consult with the Tribe before
their issuance. Id. at 398–99.
113. 603 F.2d 707, 709–10 (8th Cir. 1979).
114. Id. at 721 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236
(1974)).
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In 1975, Congress responded to the suggestions in President
Nixon’s message by enacting the Indian Self-Determination and Ed-
ucation Assistance Act, which created a mechanism for transferring
control over services previously offered by the BIA to willing Indian
tribes.115 The Act allows tribes to enter into one or more agree-
ments with the United States, known as “638 contracts,” whereby
the tribes obtain money in lieu of specific federal services. Tribes
then use the money that they receive to offer those same services
directly to the reservation community.116
The Self-Determination Act was also the first statute that re-
quired consultation with Indian tribes in certain circumstances.
The Secretary of Interior and the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare were required to consult with “national and regional
Indian organizations” while drafting both the initial regulations im-
plementing the provisions of the Act and any future amendments
thereto.117 And Congress required consultation with any Indian
tribe that could be impacted by any BIA decision to assist a state in
site acquisition, construction, or renovation of a school on or near
an Indian reservation.118
A few years later, Congress passed the Education Amendments of
1978.119 Title XI of that Act was devoted to Indian education, and
Congress directed that “[i]t shall be the policy of the [BIA] . . . to
facilitate Indian control of Indian affairs in all matters relating to
education.”120 To help ensure that this goal was achieved, the Act
115. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat.
2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–458ddd-2 (2006)).
116. 25 U.S.C. § 450l (2006); 25 C.F.R. § 271 (1996); Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamil-
ton, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1251,
1262–63 (1995). Congress broadened the Self-Determination Act in 1994 by adding a “Tribal
Self-Governance” program. Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250, 4270 (1994). Indian tribes
are now allowed to enter into a broad compact with the BIA that covers virtually all federal
services on a reservation. Johnson & Hamilton, supra, at 1267–68. They then receive a block
grant in lieu of these federal services, and can allocate this grant money in accordance with
tribal priorities. Id. The Self-Determination and Tribal Self-Governance programs have been
so successful that today, more than one-half of the BIA’s budget and nearly one-half of the
Indian Health Service’s budget is distributed directly to Indian tribes. S. Bobo Dean & Joseph
H. Webster, Contract Support Funding and the Federal Policy of Indian Tribal Self-Determination, 36
TULSA L. REV. 349, 349–50 (2000); see also Henry M. Buffalo, Jr., Implementing Self-Determination
and Self-Governance 173, 174 (2003) (course materials for the 28th Annual Federal Bar Associ-
ation Indian Law Conference, Albuquerque, N.M., Apr. 10–11, 2003) (noting that these pro-
grams have since grown to involve more than 226 tribes in more than eighty-five funding
agreements).
117. Pub. L. No. 93-638, § 107(b), 88 Stat. 2203, 2212 (1975) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 450–458ddd-2 (2006)).
118. Id. § 204(e), 88 Stat. at 2215.
119. Pub. L. No. 95-561, 92 Stat. 2143, 2321 (1978).
120. Id. § 1130, 92 Stat. at 2314 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2011(a) (2006)).
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required that Indian tribes be “actively consulted”121 in the plan-
ning and development of educational programs for Indian chil-
dren122 and in the production of a number of congressionally
mandated studies and surveys.123
Consequently, in the 1970s, the federal-tribal consultation right
was limited to instances in which the Departments of the Interior
and of Health, Education, and Welfare were providing services to
tribal members. Courts appeared willing to enforce this procedural
right against the federal government, whether it was articulated in a
statute or an internal agency policy. More than a decade would
pass, however, before the consultation right was broadened to in-
clude other agencies that provide services to tribal members124 and
to other areas of the trust responsibility.125
2. Consultation and the Duty to Protect Tribal Resources
After requiring consultation with Indian tribes regarding the pro-
vision of federal services mandated by the trust responsibility, Con-
gress enacted a series of statutes requiring consultation for federal
activities that impact Indian historic, cultural, and religious sites.126
Consultation provisions were included in, among other legislation,
the Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979,127 the Native
121. Id. § 1101(c), 92 Stat. at 2314.
122. Id.
123. Id. at §§ 1121–1122, 92 Stat. at 2316–18.
124. See infra Section II.A.3. The same day that President Clinton issued his 1994 Memo-
randum directing all agencies to consult with Indian tribes on actions that could impact the
tribes or their resources, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development issued a
policy statement acknowledging that the trust responsibility “extends to the provision of de-
cent, safe, sanitary and affordable housing to the members of Federally recognized Indian
Tribes” and agreeing to “consult with American Indian and Alaska Native Tribal govern-
ments, Indian housing authorities and national Indian organizations when developing legis-
lation, regulations and policies that affect those Tribes.” American Indian and Alaska Native
1994 Policy Statement, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV, http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/
ih/regs/1994_policystmt.cfm (last updated June 13, 2001).
125. See infra Section II.A.2.
126. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 103-104, 107 Stat. 1025, 1026 (1993) (establishing the Jemez
National Recreation Area and requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to, “in consultation with
local tribal leaders, ensure the protection of religious and cultural sites” within that area).
127. Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 (ARPA), Pub. L. No. 96-95, 93 Stat.
721 (1979). ARPA authorizes the imposition of civil and criminal penalties against persons
who remove or damage archaeological resources on federal lands without first obtaining a
permit from the appropriate federal agency official. The Act provided for the promulgation
of uniform regulations only “after consultation with . . . Indian tribe[s].” Id. § 10, 93 Stat. at
727 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470ii (2006)). Additionally, before the issuance of
any permit that may result in harm to a site of religious or cultural significance to an Indian
tribe, ARPA’s regulations require the responsible federal official to notify and consult with
affected tribes. 43 C.F.R. § 7.7 (2011).
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American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990,128 and
the 1992 Amendments to the National Historic Preservation Act.129
Federal courts interpreted similar statutes, such as the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act, to implicitly include a tribal consul-
tation right.130
The agencies charged with administering these statutes promul-
gated more detailed regulations that governed the consultation
process. For example, the National Historic Preservation Act
(NHPA) of 1966131 requires federal agencies to evaluate the poten-
tial impacts that agency actions may have on sites that are either
listed or eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic
Places.132 The NHPA was revised in 1992 to make it clear that
properties of cultural or religious significance to federally recog-
nized Indian tribes are eligible for listing on the National
Register.133 If a federal undertaking has the potential to cause ad-
verse effects to those properties, agency officials must initiate gov-
ernment-to-government consultations with the Indian tribe.134
The NHPA’s implementing regulations define consultation as
“the process of seeking, discussing, and considering the views of
other participants, and, where feasible, seeking agreement with
them regarding matters arising in the section 106 process.”135 The
regulations require that the consultations “be appropriate to the
scale of the project,”136 that they “commence early in the planning
128. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA), Pub.
L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013 (2006)). NAGPRA
provides a process for museums and Federal agencies to return Indian remains and certain
cultural items to lineal descendants, culturally affiliated Indian tribes, or Native Hawaiian
organizations. NAGPRA requires extensive consultation with Indian tribes. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C.
§ 3002(c)(2) (2006) (Native American cultural items can be removed from federal lands only
after consultation with the appropriate Indian tribe); 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(3) (2006) (“The
return of cultural items covered by this chapter shall be in consultation with the requesting
lineal descendant or tribe or organization to determine the place and manner of delivery of
such items.”).
129. Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 4006(a), 106 Stat. 4600, 4757 (1992).
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006) (“[I]t shall be the policy of the United States to protect
and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and
exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian . . . .”); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d
735, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that under the AIRFA, the federal government “should
consult Indian leaders before approving a project likely to affect religious practices”).
131. Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (1966) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 470–470x-6 (2006)).
132. 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2006).
133. Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4753 (1992).
134. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6)(B) (2006).
135. 36 C.F.R. § 800.16(f) (2011).
136. Id. § 800.2(a)(4).
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process,”137 and that they “provide[ ] the Indian tribe . . . a reasona-
ble opportunity to identify its concerns about historic properties,
advise on the identification and evaluation of historic proper-
ties . . . and participate in the resolution of adverse effects.”138
Following the enactment of these statutes, the Department of the
Interior decided to expand its consultation program. In Order No.
3175, dated November 8, 1993, the Department informed agency
officials that if “evaluation [of a proposal] reveals any impacts on
Indian trust resources,” then consultation with the affected Indian
tribe was required.139 The heads of all the Department’s bureaus
and offices were required to “prepare and publish procedures and
directives” to ensure proper implementation of the order.140 A
handful of other agencies also followed the congressional trend
and crafted their own consultation policies.141 Still, nearly all142 of
these policies provided for consultation only when federal actions
could impact tribal resources. Federal regulations and policies that
could impact tribal sovereignty were still not subjected to any fed-
eral-tribal consultation process.
137. Id. § 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(A).
138. Id.
139. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INDIAN TRUST RE-
SOURCES § 3 (1993) [hereinafter Secretarial Order No. 3175], available at http://www.fws.
gov/midwest/Tribal/documents/11-8-93SecOrder3175.pdf.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., POLICIES ON AMERICAN INDIANS AND ALASKA NATIVES
(Oct. 16, 1992) (“USDA officials will consult with tribal governments . . . regarding the influ-
ence of USDA activities on water, land, forest, air, and other natural resources of tribal gov-
ernments. . . .”); U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENT POLICY, 1992
WL 12001032, at *5 (1992) (requiring each field office or DOE installation to consult with
American Indians about the potential impacts of proposed DOE actions on areas of cultural
or religious concern to American Indians, and avoid unnecessary interference with tradi-
tional religious practices) [hereinafter 1992 DOE CONSULTATION POLICY]; Mary Christina
Wood, Fulfilling the Executive’s Trust Responsibility Toward the Native Nations on Environmental
Issues: A Partial Critique of the Clinton Administration’s Promises and Performance, 25 ENVTL. L.
733, 754–55 (1995) (discussing the Bureau of Reclamation’s “Indian Trust Policy,” which
requires the Bureau to “carry out its activities in a manner which protects trust assets and
avoids adverse impacts when possible”).
142. Despite including a specific consultation policy for cultural resources, the DOE pol-
icy also notes that “[t]he Department will consult with tribal governments to assure [sic] that
tribal rights and concerns are considered prior to DOE taking actions, making decisions or
implementing programs that may affect tribes.” See 1992 DOE CONSULTATION POLICY, supra
note 141, at *5. R
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3. Clinton’s Executive Orders and Across-the-Board
Consultation Requirements
A major milestone in the development of the tribal consultation
right came when William Clinton was elected President of the
United States. In his first year in office, President Clinton issued
Executive Order 12875, entitled “Enhancing the Intergovernmental
Partnership.”143 In that Executive Order, he directed agencies to
reduce the number of unfunded federal mandates imposed on
“State, local, and tribal governments” and to develop a process that
would permit elected officials, including tribal officials, “to provide
meaningful and timely input in the development of regulatory pro-
posals containing significant unfunded mandates.”144 More broadly,
the Executive Order required agencies “to establish regular and
meaningful consultation and collaboration with State, local, and tri-
bal governments on Federal matters that significantly or uniquely
affect their communities.”145
While Executive Order 12875 recognized that consultation was
an important part of intergovernmental cooperation generally, the
next year, President Clinton also acknowledged that consultation
with Indian tribes was also required by the trust responsibility. On
April 29, 1994, he issued a memorandum stating that the “unique
legal relationship with Native American tribal governments” re-
quired that all executive agencies consult with Indian tribes:
Each executive department and agency shall consult, to the
greatest extent practicable and to the extent permitted by law,
with tribal governments prior to taking actions that affect fed-
erally recognized tribal governments.146
This memorandum was presented at an historic tribal summit,
where President Clinton invited leaders from all of the federally
recognized Indian tribes to meet and discuss Indian policy with
him.147
Over the next several years, President Clinton further defined
and strengthened this general consultation mandate through the
143. Exec. Order No. 12875, Enhancing the Intergovernmental Partnership, 58 Fed. Reg.
58,093 (Oct. 26, 1993).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal Governments:
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951,
22,951 (Apr. 29, 1994) [hereinafter 1994 Memorandum or Clinton Memorandum].
147. Douglas Jehl, Clinton Meets Indians, Citing a New Respect, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1994, at
10.
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issuance of Executive Order 13084148 and Executive Order 13175.149
In particular, the latter order transformed the rather vague lan-
guage in the 1994 Memorandum into a detailed directive with
deadlines for the creation of internal consultation processes:
Each agency shall have an accountable process to ensure the
meaningful and timely input by tribal officials in the develop-
ment of regulatory policies that have tribal implications.
Within 30 days . . . the head of the agency shall designate an
official with the principal responsibility for the agency’s imple-
mentation of this order. Within 60 days . . . the designated
official shall submit to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) a description of the agency’s consultation process.150
The scope of Executive Order 13175 extends beyond notice-and-
comment rulemakings to include “regulations, legislative com-
ments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or
actions that have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian
tribes.”151
Clinton’s 1994 Memorandum and 1998 and 2000 Executive Or-
ders resulted in a proliferation of internal consultation policies152
148. Executive Order No. 13084, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Gov-
ernments, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (May 14, 1998).
149. Executive Order No. 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Gov-
ernments, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000).
150. Id. at 67,250.
151. Id. at 67,249.
152. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AMERICAN INDIAN &
ALASKA NATIVE TRIBAL GOVERNMENT POLICY 4 (2006) (amending Aug. 21, 2001 policy) (not-
ing that the Department will consult “regarding current and proposed actions affecting
tribes,” by providing timely notice in the early planning stages, and pre-draft consultation
sessions), available at http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/tribalenergy/pdfs/doe_indian_policy
2006.pdf; National Indian Gaming Commission, Government-to-Government Tribal Consul-
tation Policy, 69 Fed. Reg. 16,973, 16,978 (Mar. 31, 2004) (committing to “consultation and
collaboration” with Indian tribes when formulating regulations, bulletins, guidelines, or pre-
paring legislative proposals or comments for Congress); U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT TRIBAL CONSULTATION POLICY (2001), available at http://
portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_housing/ih/regs/
govtogov_tcp; U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POLICY (1998) (com-
mitting to, among other things, “[p]roviding timely notice to, and consulting with, tribal
governments prior to taking any actions that may have the potential to significantly affect
protected tribal resources, tribal rights, or Indian lands”), available at http://aec.army.mil/
usaec/cultural/nativepolicy.pdf; U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, POLICY GUIDANCE LETTER NO.
57: INDIAN TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS WITH INDIAN
TRIBES (1998) (promising “pre-decisional and honest consultation” by involving tribes “in
collaborative processes designed to ensure information exchange, consideration of disparate
viewpoints before and during decision making, and utiliz[ing] fair and impartial dispute res-
olution mechanisms”), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/
pgls/pgl57a.pdf; Department of Justice Policy on Indian Sovereignty and Government-to-
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and regulations153 within federal agencies. Since then, each Presi-
dent has reaffirmed that the federal government has a duty to con-
sult with Indian tribes as necessary to achieve the substantive goals
of the trust responsibility.154
B. Recent Attempts to Reform the Consultation Right
Despite all of these statutes, executive orders, regulations, and
agency policies, implementation of the federal duty to consult with
Indian tribes has been lacking. For example, in 2003, the Depart-
ment of the Interior was considering a major reorganization that
proposed to separate the Office of Indian Education Programs
from the BIA and reorganize that office into a new Bureau of In-
dian Education Programs. The Department did not consult with In-
dian tribes while it was developing this proposal and only began to
do so after the National Congress of American Indians passed a
resolution demanding such consultation.155 Furthermore, the con-
sultation that ultimately occurred was inadequate because the De-
partment failed to fully describe the proposed reorganization and,
without this information, tribes were not able to make informed
decisions about their views on the proposal.156 It was only after the
reorganization was actually implemented that Indian tribes discov-
ered that many programs would be cut and fewer resources would
be made available to federally operated schools.157
Government Relations with Indian Tribes, 61 Fed. Reg. 29,424 (June 10, 1996) (“Consistent
with federal law and other Departmental duties, the Department will consult with tribal lead-
ers in its decisions that relate to or affect the sovereignty, rights, resources or lands of Indian
tribes.”); BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, TRIBAL POLICY (1996) (“BPA will consult with
Tribal governments . . . when a proposed BPA action may affect the Tribes or their re-
sources.”), available at http://www.bpa.gov/news/Tribal/Documents/Trbl-policy.pdf; U.S.
Dep’t of Interior, Departmental Responsibilities for Indian Trust Resources, in U.S. DEP’T OF
INTERIOR, DEPARTMENTAL MANUAL, pt. 512, ch. 2 (revised following the 1994 Clinton Memo-
randum to indicate that it was the Department’s policy “to consult with tribes on a govern-
ment-to-government basis whenever plans or actions affect tribal trust resources, trust assets,
or tribal health and safety”), available at http://www.usbr.gov/native/policy/DM_FInal_12-1-
95_512%20DM%202.pdf.
153. See, e.g., Policy Statement on Consultation with Indian Tribes in Commission Proceedings,
104 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,108 (July 23, 2003) (18 C.F.R. Part 2).
154. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Memorandum on Government-to-Government
relationship with Tribal Governments, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2177 (Sept. 23, 2004) (disseminated to
the heads of executive departments and agencies).
155. NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, RES. NO. PHX-03-038, REQUEST TO HALT BIA REORGAN-
IZATION OF OFFICE OF INDIAN EDUCATION PROGRAMS (2003).
156. NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, RES. NO. SAC-06-026, CALLING FOR THE CREATION OF AN
AD HOC TRIBAL TASK FORCE TO RE-EVALUATE THE FEDERAL CONSULTATION POLICY (2006).
157. Id.
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Including consultation as a poorly coordinated afterthought to
government action was not an isolated incident. Problems with the
application of the federal consultation duty were widespread in the
years that followed Executive Order 13175.158 In 2008, while intro-
ducing legislation that was intended to reform the consultation
duty,159 Representative Nick Rahall claimed that the Bush adminis-
tration “has flagrantly ignored this responsibility.”160 It “takes
actions that often have serious and negative consequences on In-
dian country, without any consultation at all.”161
Even when some amount of consultation occurred, tribal leaders
found the process ineffectual. Joe Shirley, then President of the
Navajo Nation, explained his frustration in a hearing before the
House Committee on Natural Resources:
One need only look to the [BIA] to see the ineffectiveness of
tribal consultation. . . . [The BIA budgetary] process
culminates each year with a meeting in a Washington area con-
ference facility where tribal leaders come in to ask the BIA for
help to protect our resources, our culture, our existence. . . .
While the tribal leaders pour out their hearts talking about the
needs of their people, BIA bureaucrats sit there impassively lis-
tening. All the while, the BIA officials know that the budgetary
158. For example, the NHPA’s consultation requirement has only been in place since
1992, yet it has spawned a large number of cases brought by Indian tribes unsatisfied with the
process. See, e.g., Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone of Nev. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 608
F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2010); Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 469 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2006);
Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 1995); Quechan Tribe of the Fort
Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
159. 154 CONG. REC. 4156 (Mar. 13, 2008) (introducing H.R 5608).
160. 154 CONG. REC. E383, E384 (Mar. 13, 2008) (statement of Rep. Nick J. Rahall).
When the House Committee on Natural Resources held hearings on the bill, Representative
Rahall and others gave specific examples of the federal government’s failure to consult with
Indian tribes. One such example involved the BIA, which had released a memorandum
called “Guidance on Taking Off-Reservation Land into Trust for Gaming Purposes.” This
memorandum required that new trust land acquisitions be within a “commutable distance”
from the tribe’s existing reservation. The very next day, the BIA used this guidance memo-
randum to support its decisions to deny several pending land-in-trust applications. The possi-
bility of a “commutable distance test” had never even been mentioned to Indian tribes, and
no consultation occurred before the release of this memorandum. See Hearing on H.R. 5608,
supra note 102, at 2 (statement of Rep. Nick J. Rahall, Chairman, H. Comm. on Nat. Res.); see R
also Department of the Interior’s Recently Released Guidance on Taking Land into Trust for Indian
Tribes and Its Ramifications Policy on Off-Reservation Acquisition of Land in Trust for Indian Gam-
ing, Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Natural Res., 110th Cong. 70 (2008) (statement of Kevin
K. Washburn, Oneida Indian Nation Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School) (calling
development of Interior’s policy “haphazard,” and noting that “the weakness of the Guidance
Memorandum is directly attributable to the failure to consult on these important policies
with tribal governments”).
161. 154 CONG. REC. E383, E384 (Mar. 13, 2008) (statement of Rep. Nick J. Rahall).
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decisions have already been made, and that ‘consultation’ is
nothing more than a pretense to being able to say that we lis-
tened and took notes but other priorities governed the
process.162
While the consultation process was undoubtedly in need of re-
form, the legislation proposed by Representative Rahall was flawed.
Tribal leaders were unhappy that, as it was drafted, the bill would
have only applied to the Department of the Interior, the Indian
Health Service, and the National Indian Gaming Commission.163
Administration witnesses pointed out that the bill did nothing to
clarify what constitutes consultation, but instead simply required
that each agency develop its own “accountable consultation pro-
cess.”164 These witnesses believed that this would result in an over-
whelming amount of litigation brought by Indian tribes.165 After
hearings on the bill were held in the House Committee on Natural
Resources, no further action was taken.
On November 5, 2009, President Obama issued a memorandum
to the heads of executive departments and agencies. That memo-
randum formally adopted President Clinton’s Executive Order
13175, and it reminded federal officials that they “are charged with
engaging in regular and meaningful consultation and collaboration
with tribal officials in the development of Federal policies that have
tribal implications.”166 It also directed each agency to submit a de-
tailed plan describing the actions that it would take to implement
this mandate.167 The Obama Memorandum required that agency
plans be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) within ninety days. Agencies were also expected to submit
an annual progress report on the status of each action item within
their plan.168
162. Hearing on H.R. 5608, supra note 102, at 25 (statement of Joe Shirley, President, The R
Navajo Nation).
163. See, e.g., id. at 36 (statement of Gerald Danforth, Chairman, Oneida Nation of
Wisconsin).
164. See id. at 11 (statement of Phil Hogen, Chairman, National Indian Gaming
Commission).
165. Id. at 12.
166. President Barack Obama, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,881, 57,881 (Nov. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Obama
Memorandum].
167. Id.
168. Id.
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While at least one commentator has lauded the issuance of Presi-
dent Obama’s memorandum,169 it falls short of initiating meaning-
ful changes to the federal-tribal consultation process. The
Memorandum requires agencies to submit a detailed plan of action
and annual updates, but it does not provide a concrete timeline by
which agencies are to have a final a consultation policy in place. In
fact, agencies can comply with the letter of the Obama Memoran-
dum without actually developing a final policy at all.
This problem is illustrated by the Office of Science and Technol-
ogy Policy (OSTP), which submitted its consultation plan to the
OMB in January 2010.170 The short plan indicated that the OSTP
would develop a consultation policy and publish a draft of that pol-
icy in the Federal Register.171 One year later, however, the agency has
still not published a draft policy.
The OSTP did file an annual progress report, which was only
one-half page in length.172 That report claims that three actions es-
tablish its compliance with the President’s Memorandum. First, it
“posted its plan on the OSTP website to promote effective commu-
nication between the agency and tribal nations.”173 Second, the
agency “has determined that it will use web-based technology, tele-
phone calls, letters, email, and face-to-face meetings for its tribal
consultations,”174 a laundry list that includes forms of communica-
tion (e.g., letters, email) that are not conducive to consultation.
And third, the agency’s only consultation with tribes prior to draft-
ing this annual progress report was through participation in two
teleconferences, arranged by an entirely different agency—the De-
partment of the Interior—in January 2010.175 The OSTP’s annual
report provides no update on the status of the agency’s draft con-
sultation policy, and both the plan and progress report show that
the agency has spent little time thinking about the federal govern-
ment’s consultation duty.
169. See Gabriel S. Galanda, The Federal Indian Consultation Right: A Frontline Defense Against
Tribal Sovereignty Incursion, FED. INDIAN LAW (2010), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/
buslaw/committees/CL121000pub/newsletter/201101/galanda.pdf.
170. OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY PLAN TO
DEVELOP A TRIBAL CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION POLICY IMPLEMENTING EXECUTIVE OR-
DER 13175 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/
ostp/OSTP-Tribal-Consultation-Policy-Plan.pdf.
171. Id. at 2.
172. OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY PROGRESS
REPORT IN COMPLIANCE WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER 13175 ON “CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION
WITH INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS” (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/microsites/ostp/OSTP-Tribal-Consultation-Progress-Report.pdf.
173. Id. at 1
174. Id.
175. Id.
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Other agencies are taking the Obama Memorandum more seri-
ously. Unfortunately, they have not been provided with any
guidance about how to improve their existing, Clinton-era policies.
The Obama Memorandum does not even explain what “consulta-
tion” means or when the consultation right is triggered. In sum,
while well-intentioned, the Obama Memorandum falls short of cre-
ating any real change to the federal-tribal relationship.
III. LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING CONSULTATION POLICIES
Federal-tribal consultation provisions have continued to prolifer-
ate following President Obama’s Memorandum, but instead of cre-
ating fanfare, they have been received with a great deal of
skepticism. In fact, one tribal attorney has claimed that consultation
is simply a modern means of perpetuating the betrayal of Indians
by the federal government.176 While this statement may be extreme,
it correctly indicates that there are a number of limitations to the
federal-tribal consultation right as it is currently structured. These
include problems with enforceability, specificity, uniformity, and a
lack of substantive constraints.
A. Enforceability Issues for the Procedural Right to Consultation
As discussed above, the duty to consult with Indian tribes is
rooted in the federal government’s common law trust responsibility
to tribes. Despite this, no court has held that this common law duty,
standing alone, creates a private cause of action for Indian tribes.177
176. Derek C. Haskew, Federal Consultation with Indian Tribes: The Foundation of Enlightened
Policy Decisions, or Another Badge of Shame?, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 21, 24 (2000).
177. In fact, only a handful of courts have even referred to the common-law consultation
duty. See Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707, 721 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding
that the BIA’s actions in transferring the Superintendent of the Pine Ridge Agency, without
first consulting with the Oglala Sioux Tribe, violated not only the agency’s consultation pol-
icy but also “the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its deal-
ings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people”) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415
U.S. 199, 236 (1974)); Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakama Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., No. CV-10-3050-EFS, 2010 WL 3434091, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 30, 2010) (determin-
ing that the decision to grant a private contractor the right to move garbage from Hawaii
over the Tribe’s ceded lands in Washington State posed “serious questions about whether
[the USDA] adequately consulted with the Yakama Nation as required by . . . federal Indian
trust common law”); Klamath Tribes v. United States, No. 96-381-HA, 1996 WL 924509, at *8
(D. Or. Oct. 2, 1996) (“In practical terms, a procedural duty has arisen from the trust rela-
tionship such that the federal government must consult with an Indian Tribe in the decision-
making process to avoid adverse effects on treaty resources.”); Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Rhoades, 804 F. Supp. 251, 261–62 (D.N.M. 1992) (quoting Oglala Sioux Tribe).
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The reluctance to recognize a private cause of action for violations
of the common law consultation right stems from federal courts’
current confusion over trust responsibility claims in general.
Over the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has heard several
cases in which Indian tribes sought monetary damages against the
federal government for mismanagement of Indian trust property.178
These lawsuits were permitted because the United States waived its
sovereign immunity through the Indian Tucker Act.179 The limited
waiver of immunity contained in that Act, however, requires that
tribal claims be based on the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, or
Executive Orders.180 Because of these restrictions on the United
States’ waiver of sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court has de-
nied tribal claims for breach of the trust responsibility when those
claims rely exclusively on the federal government’s common law du-
ties and do not possess any statutory support.181
These cases, however, should have no impact on tribal claims for
declaratory or injunctive relief for breaches of the trust responsibil-
ity.182 Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s longstanding decision in Ex
Parte Young, no waiver of sovereign immunity is required if a plain-
tiff claims that a federal official has violated federal law (including
federal common law) provided that the plaintiff names the federal
official, rather than the agency itself, as the defendant.183 Still,
lower federal courts have failed to recognize this distinction. In-
stead, recent cases have concluded that trust responsibility litigation
can only be successful if it is tied to the violation of a specific statute
178. See United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo II), 556 U.S. 287 (2009); United States v.
Navajo Nation (Navajo I), 537 U.S. 488 (2003); United States v. White Mountain Apache
Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003); United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206 (1983);
United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I), 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
179. See 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2006); see also Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 216 (“If a claim falls within
the terms of the [Indian] Tucker Act, the United States has presumptively consented to
suit.”).
180. The Indian Tucker Act provides:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction of any claim against
the United States accruing after August 13, 1946, in favor of any tribe . . . whenever
such claim is one arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States,
or Executive orders of the President, or is one which otherwise would be cognizable in
the Court of Federal Claims if the claimant were not an Indian tribe, band, or group.
28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2006).
181. Navajo I, 537 U.S. at 503 (“To state a litigable claim, a tribal plaintiff must invoke a
rights-creating source of substantive law . . . .”).
182. See Mary Christina Wood, The Indian Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal Lands and
Resources Through Claims of Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies, 39 TULSA L. REV. 355, 368
(2003).
183. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
33129-m
re_46-2 S
heet N
o. 56 S
ide B
      03/21/2013   10:43:50
33129-mre_46-2 Sheet No. 56 Side B      03/21/2013   10:43:50
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MRE\46-2\MRE202.txt unknown Seq: 34 18-MAR-13 12:34
450 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 46:2
or regulation.184 Courts holding such a limited view of the trust re-
sponsibility therefore do not recognize the federal government’s
enforceable common law duty to consult with Indian tribes before
taking actions that may impact them.
As a result, tribes are forced to point to a particular statute,
agency regulation, policy, or executive order that gives them a right
to consult with federal officials. As discussed in Part II(A) supra,
most of the statutory provisions that require consultation with In-
dian tribes are limited to the BIA’s provision of services and to fed-
eral activities that may impact Indian cultural or religious sites.185
Only Clinton’s executive orders and the agency policies they
produced extend the federal government’s consultation duty to all
areas of the federal trust responsibility.
These broader provisions, however, are largely unenforceable.
Courts typically hold that executive orders are unenforceable unless
the plaintiff can show both that the President issued the order pur-
suant to a statutory mandate and that the order indicates that the
President intended to create a private cause of action.186 Clinton’s
executive orders do not rely on any statutory mandate; instead, they
admit that the consultation duty arises from the trust responsibility,
which is derived from the “Constitution of the United States, trea-
ties, statutes, Executive orders, and court decisions.”187 Further-
more, Clinton’s orders explicitly disclaim the creation of any
private cause of action: Executive Order 13084, for example, states
that it “is intended only to improve the internal management of the
executive branch” and “does not[ ] create any right, benefit, or
trust responsibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or
equity by a party against the United States.”188 President Obama’s
recent memorandum contains similar restrictions.189 Unsurpris-
ingly, federal courts have refused to entertain lawsuits alleging a
184. See Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 161 F.3d 569, 574
(9th Cir. 1998) (“[A]lthough the United States does owe a general trust responsibility to
Indian tribes, unless there is a specific duty that has been placed on the government with
respect to Indians, this responsibility is discharged by the agency’s compliance with general
regulations and statutes not specifically aimed at protecting Indian tribes.”); accord Gros Ven-
tre Tribe v. United States, 469 F.3d 801, 810 (9th Cir. 2006).
185. See text accompanying notes 114–115 & 123–126.
186. See, e.g., Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 747–48 (2nd Cir. 1995); Facchiano Constr.
Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 987 F.2d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 1993); Indep. Meat Packers Ass’n v.
Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 236 (8th Cir. 1975).
187. Clinton Memorandum, supra note 146, at 22,951. R
188. Executive Order No. 13084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655, 27,656 (May 14, 1998). In Morongo
Band of Mission Indians v. Fed. Aviation Admin., the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce an execu-
tive order containing similar language. See 161 F.3d 569, 575 (9th Cir. 1998).
189. Obama Memorandum, supra note 166 , at 57,882 (“This memorandum is not in- R
tended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at
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violation of the consultation duty that arises out of Clinton’s and
Obama’s executive orders and memoranda.190
Lastly, Clinton’s Executive Order 13175 directed each federal
agency to create internal consultation processes. Rather than create
these processes through notice-and-comment rulemaking, nearly
every agency chose to comply with this directive by issuing orders,
creating informal policies, and revising handbook procedures. Like
the executive orders from which they are derived, these policies are
largely unenforceable by Indian tribes.
Some of these agency policies explicitly state that they are not
meant to create a private cause of action for Indian tribes.191 For
example, the National Indian Gaming Commission’s (NIGC) tribal
consultation policy states that it “is not intended to nor does it cre-
ate any right to administrative or judicial review, or any other right,
benefit, trust responsibility, or cause of action, substantive or proce-
dural.”192 When the policy was in draft form, several Indian tribes
asked that this provision be removed because they felt that it “ab-
solve[d] the NIGC of all responsibility to adhere to the policy.”193
The agency declined to do so, however, noting that “[s]tatements
of policy do not typically create rights to administrative or judicial
review, nor other causes of action,” and that this provision was
therefore necessary to avoid misunderstandings.194 Nevertheless,
this response did not address the broader issue of why the agency,
which was already complying with the Administrative Procedure
Act’s (APA’s) notice-and-comment procedures, did not simply
adopt these consultation provisions as enforceable regulations.
Other agency policies are silent as to the creation of a cause of
action, but longstanding precedent typically prevents their enforce-
ability. For example, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that hand-
book provisions are not binding on an agency unless they “have
been promulgated pursuant to a specific statutory grant of
authority and in conformance with the procedural requirements
law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities,
its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.”).
190. See, e.g., George v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 19063-03, 2006 WL 1627980, at
*3 (T.C. June 13, 2006) (“Executive Order 13175 lacks the force and effect of law because it
is not grounded in a statutory mandate.”).
191. For example, the Department of the Interior’s Secretarial Order No. 3175 noted
that it was “for internal management guidance only, and shall not be construed to grant or
vest any right to any party in respect to any Federal action not otherwise granted or vested by
existing law or regulations.” Secretarial Order No. 3175, supra note 139, at § 1. R
192. National Indian Gaming Commission, Government-to-Government Tribal Consulta-
tion Policy, 69 Fed. Reg. 16,973, 16,979 (Mar. 31, 2004).
193. Id. at 16,976.
194. Id. at 16,977.
33129-m
re_46-2 S
heet N
o. 57 S
ide B
      03/21/2013   10:43:50
33129-mre_46-2 Sheet No. 57 Side B      03/21/2013   10:43:50
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MRE\46-2\MRE202.txt unknown Seq: 36 18-MAR-13 12:34
452 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 46:2
imposed by Congress,” and “prescribe substantive rules—not inter-
pretive rules, general statements of policy or rules of agency organi-
zation, procedure or practice.”195 While this rule was not created in
the specific context of tribal consultation policies, it has been ap-
plied to such policies by the Ninth Circuit.
In Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie,196 the Tribe brought suit seeking
to enjoin the BIA from moving its Northern California Agency of-
fice from the Hoopa Valley Reservation to Redding, California.
Among other things, the Tribe claimed that it was not properly con-
sulted prior to this decision, as required by the BIA’s 1972 Guide-
lines for Consultation with Tribal Groups on Personnel Management
Within the Bureau of Indian Affairs.197 The Court held that the BIA’s
consultation guidelines were unenforceable because the agency
had not conceded they had the force of law, and instead of being
promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking, the guide-
lines were “in letter form and unpublished.”198 In fact, only the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has ever en-
forced a federal-tribal consultation policy that was found outside of
a statute or regulation.199
Finally, not only is judicial review unavailable in most cases, but
agencies have not created internal dispute-resolution processes that
would allow Indian tribes to challenge a lack of federal-tribal con-
sultation. In fact, only one agency—the Administration for Chil-
dren and Families within the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services—has a policy that establishes a mechanism for
tribal officials to raise concerns about the consultation process to
195. United States v. Fifty-Three (53) Eclectus Parrots, 685 F.2d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir.
1982); see also River Runners for Wilderness v. Martin, 593 F.3d 1064, 1071–72 (9th Cir.
2010); W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Espy, 79 F.3d 896, 901–02 (9th Cir. 1996).
196. 812 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1987).
197. Id. at 1103.
198. Id.
199. The only consultation policy enforced by the Eighth Circuit has been the BIA’s 1972
Guidelines. In the first case addressing the Guidelines, the BIA conceded that they were
enforceable, and the Court readily agreed. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d
707, 721 (8th Cir. 1979). When the BIA argued that these Guidelines were unenforceable in
later litigation, District courts in the Eighth Circuit rejected this about-face. See Yankton
Sioux Tribe v. Kempthorne, 442 F. Supp. 2d 774, 784 (D.S.D. 2006) (“Where the BIA has
established a policy requiring prior consultation with a tribe, and therefore created a justified
expectation that the tribe will receive a meaningful opportunity to express its views before
policy is made, that opportunity must be given.”); Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Deer, 911 F.
Supp. 395, 399–400 (D.S.D. 1995) (noting that the BIA had interpreted these consultation
provisions as binding in the past and had not narrowed or eliminated them, and requiring
the agency to “tell[ ] the truth and keep[ ] [its] promises”); see also Winnebago Tribe of Neb.
v. Babbitt, 915 F. Supp. 157, 163 (D.S.D. 1996) (holding that the BIA has the discretion to
terminate employees but must first consult with the affected tribe).
33129-m
re_46-2 S
heet N
o. 58 S
ide A
      03/21/2013   10:43:50
33129-mre_46-2 Sheet No. 58 Side A      03/21/2013   10:43:50
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MRE\46-2\MRE202.txt unknown Seq: 37 18-MAR-13 12:34
WINTER 2013] Toward Genuine Tribal Consultation 453
high-ranking agency officials.200 Only the limited consultation du-
ties found in federal statutes and regulations are thus typically en-
forceable by Indian tribes. This lack of enforceability has severely
restricted the effectiveness of the tribal right to consultation, and it
has reduced tribes’ willingness to work with federal agencies.201
B. Lack of Specificity for Procedural Requirements
The effectiveness of federal-tribal consultation is impeded by an-
other practical roadblock. The consultation requirement currently
lacks the specificity needed to provide clear guidelines to agency
actors, tribal officials, and reviewing courts. While it has become
“fashionable” to talk of tribal consultation, “consultation remains
an ill-defined term.”202
1. Of What Does Consultation Consist?
Congress has enacted several statutes that require federal agen-
cies to consult with Indian tribes,203 but none of these statutes in-
cludes a definition of consultation. Likewise, the executive orders
and memoranda issued by Presidents Clinton and Obama fail to
provide a definition of this key term, and conflicting inferences can
be drawn from those documents. On the one hand, Clinton’s 1994
Memorandum and Executive Order 13084 require executive
200. If an impasse arises between the Administration for Children and Families (ACF)
and a tribe concerning compliance with the consultation policy or the outcome of consulta-
tion, the tribe may file a written notice of conflict resolution. Department of Health and
Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Tribal Consultation Policy, 76
Fed. Reg. 55,678, 55,678 (Sept. 8, 2011) [hereinafter ACF Consultation Policy]. The agency’s
policy states that “any action that is the subject of an impasse will be stayed until the conflict
resolution process with ACF is complete to the extent practicable and permitted by law.” Id.
at 55,687. After filing a written notice, the tribe will meet with the Assistant Secretary for
Children and Families, a Deputy Assistant Secretary, the Commissioner for the Administra-
tion for Native Americans, or the ACF Regional Administrator for the Regional Office that
provide services to the affected tribe. Id. If the tribe is unhappy with how the official resolves
the matter, it may then raise its concerns with the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services. Id. While this process is a far cry from judicial review, it does provide Indian
tribes with a way to discuss their concerns with high-ranking agency officials while the matter
is held in abeyance.
201. Haskew, supra note 176, at 27–28 (asserting that lack of enforceability “ultimately R
will damage federal-tribal relations,” because if an agency is able to ignore its own policies,
that agency’s “poor behavior may reduce the tribes’ willingness to work with the agency” or
other agencies in the future).
202. Id. at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
203. See, e.g., supra Part II.A.2.
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branch agencies to ensure that tribes have the opportunity “to pro-
vide meaningful and timely input” about federal proposals.204 This
phrase could be interpreted to require only that Indian tribes have
an opportunity to provide information and express their views
about a federal proposal. On the other hand, Executive Order
13175 requires “consultation and collaboration” with Indian
tribes205 and Obama’s Memorandum refers to the necessity of
“meaningful dialogue between Federal officials and tribal officials.”206
These more recent pronouncements seem to require that the two
parties engage in back-and-forth discussions to work towards a joint
resolution of the issues presented.
Without clear and consistent direction from either Congress or
the President, agencies have, unsurprisingly, interpreted the con-
sultation requirement differently. Several agencies have issued draft
or final consultation policies that claim that publication of a propo-
sal for federal action in the Federal Register is sufficient, by itself, to
satisfy the government’s consultation duty to Indian tribes. For in-
stance, the Office of National Drug Control Policy released a draft
consultation policy in April 2011, which specifies that the agency’s
consultation will consist of “one or more of the following”: written
correspondence, meetings, and Federal Register notices.207 Similarly,
the Department of Education’s new three-page consultation policy
explains that consultation may include “Federal Register documents,”
which will help to facilitate “the goal of meaningful and timely par-
ticipation.”208 The Department plans to simply “invite input from
Indian tribal officials in the preamble of any notice of proposed
rulemaking” if the rule might impact Indian tribes.209
Policies such as these improperly conflate the public’s right to
notice and comment with the federal government’s consultation
duty to Indian tribes. The APA already gives all persons the right to
notice of and the opportunity to comment on agency rulemak-
ings.210 Regulations for implementing the National Environmental
204. Executive Order 13084, supra note 136, at 27,655; see also Clinton Memorandum, R
supra note 134, at 22,951. R
205. Executive Order No. 13175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249, 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000).
206. Obama Memorandum, supra note 153, at 57,881 (emphasis added). R
207. Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, Exec. Office of the President, Draft Tribal Con-
sultation Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. 18,583, 18,584 (Apr. 4, 2011).
208. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION PROCESS WITH INDIAN TRIBAL
GOVERNMENTS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 13175 2 (2011) [hereinafter EDUCATION CONSULTA-
TION POLICY], available at http://www.tedna.org/pubs/doe%2013175.pdf.
209. Id.
210. The APA provides that a proposed rule must be published in the Federal Register, and
interested persons shall then be given “an opportunity to participate in the rule making
through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral
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Policy Act (NEPA) similarly provide persons with notice of and the
ability to comment on federal actions that could significantly im-
pact the environment.211 These statutes were enacted in 1946 and
1969, respectively; therefore, Indian tribes and their members had
an enforceable right to comment on federal actions long before the
legislative and executive branches recognized the tribal consulta-
tion duty. The right to consultation would be virtually meaningless
if it did not require more.212
Other agencies have crafted consultation policies that acknowl-
edge that Federal Register notices, standing alone, do not satisfy the
consultation duty. Nevertheless, nearly all of these policies still
consider such notices to constitute evidence of consultation. For
example, the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) de-
veloped a detailed consultation policy that was published in the Fed-
eral Register on September 8, 2011.213 Indeed, the overall policy
seems to be a dramatic improvement on Clinton-era consultation
policies. But while this policy states that Federal Register notices “will
not be used as a sole method of communication for consultation,”
it lists the mediums for conducting consultation as meetings, writ-
ten correspondence, and Federal Register notices.214
presentation.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2006). The APA defines “persons” to include “an indi-
vidual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or private organization other than an
agency.” Id. § 551(2). Therefore, Indian tribes and individual tribal members are able to
comment on any proposal governed by the APA.
211. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (2011) (providing that after preparing a draft environmental im-
pact statement, the agency shall request comments from Indian tribes and the general pub-
lic, which includes all “persons or organizations who may be interested or affected” by the
agency action).
212. If the right to consultation only affords Indian tribes the right to comment, consulta-
tion could, at most, broaden rights already afforded under the APA and NEPA by providing
tribes with the ability to comment on informal agency actions that are not subject to the APA.
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2006) (APA notice and comment procedures do not apply “to
interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure,
or practice”).
213. ACF Consultation Policy, supra note 200. R
214. Id. at 55,686. Similarly, the Department of the Interior’s draft consultation policy
states that the Department will attempt to “avoid impersonal forms of communication,”
which presumably includes Federal Register notices and form letters, while at the same time
providing that consultations will occur through “meetings, telephone conversations, written
notice, or a combination of all three.” U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, DRAFT DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR POLICY ON CONSULTATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES 3 (2012) [hereinafter DOI DRAFT
CONSULTATION POLICY] (emphasis added), available at http://www.doi.gov/governments/
loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=119393; see also U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ACTION
PLAN FOR TRIBAL CONSULTATION AND COLLABORATION 14–15 (2009) [hereinafter USDA AC-
TION PLAN] (implying that a Federal Register notice does not fulfill the agency’s consultation
duty by noting that “policies will encourage face-to-face consultation,” and stating that
although written correspondence can also take place, it should “clearly . . . identify the poten-
tially affected Tribes, include any agency positions on the issues, and identify the type of
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There is a fundamental difference between the public
participation process (notice and comment), which is an informa-
tion-gathering exercise, and consultation, which is a government-to-
government process that requires greater involvement in decision
making by Indian tribes.215 Yet there are only a small number of
agency policies and regulations that explicitly recognize this differ-
ence. Examples include regulations that implement the NHPA,
which define consultation as “the process of seeking, discussing,
and considering the views of other participants, and, where feasible,
seeking agreement with them . . . .”216
Even when agencies consult under these regulations, however,
they do not seem to alter their consultation processes to emphasize
two-way dialogue. Instead, agencies routinely catalog the number of
“contacts” that they have with a particular tribe through notices,
letters, phone calls, and other means. They then consider all of
these contacts to collectively constitute consultation. They do so
without distinguishing whether this contact was designed to provide
the tribe with information about the proposal, to solicit informa-
tion from the tribe, or to discuss the information gathered.
For example, in the Ruby Pipeline project discussed below, one
section of the project’s final environmental impact statement in-
cludes a table entitled “Native American Consultations for the Ruby
Pipeline Project.”217 That table lists scoping notices218 published in
input sought, how to provide input and when to provide input”), available at http://www.
usda.gov/documents/ConsultationPlan.pdf.
215. See, e.g., INDIGENOUS PEOPLES SUBCOMM. OF THE NAT’L ENVTL. JUSTICE ADVISORY
COUNCIL, GUIDE ON CONSULTATION AND COLLABORATION WITH INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS
AND THE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION OF INDIGENOUS GROUPS AND TRIBAL MEMBERS IN ENVIRONMEN-
TAL DECISION MAKING 3, 5 (2000) (discussing the differences between federal-tribal consulta-
tion and public participation in agency decision making and noting that consultation
“should be a collaborative process between government peers that seeks to reach a consensus
on how to proceed”).
216. 36 C.F.R. § 800.16(f) (2013). Likewise, the Environmental Protection Agency’s new
consultation policy defines and separates the “notification phase” from the subsequent “in-
put phase.” ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, POLICY ON CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION WITH
INDIAN TRIBES 4–5 (2011) (noting that the input phase may consist of “written and oral
communications including exchanges of information, phone calls, meetings, and other ap-
propriate interactions depending upon the specific circumstances involved. . . . [that create]
opportunities to provide, receive, and discuss input”), available at http://www.epa.gov/tp/
pdf/cons-and-coord-with-indian-tribes-policy.pdf.
217. FERC, RUBY PIPELINE PROJECT FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT tbl. 4.10.3-1,
at 4-243 (Jan. 8, 2010), available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/enviro/eis/2010/01-
08-10.asp.
218. Scoping is a preliminary stage under NEPA where agencies attempt to establish the
breadth of environmental review for the proposed project. A scoping notice describes the
preliminary concept of the project, and asks the public to identify potential project alterna-
tives or specific aspects of the environmental impact that need to be analyzed. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 1501.7 (2013).
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the Federal Register, public scoping meetings required by NEPA,
form letters sent to Indian tribes by the project proponent, and
form letters sent by federal agencies to Indian tribes that described
the project and enclosed the draft environmental impact statement
or related documents.219 While none of these contacts seem to con-
stitute instances of government-to-government tribal consultation,
each tribe’s receipt of these notices or letters is dutifully checked
off on this “consultation” chart as evidence that federal obligations
have been fulfilled.220 A chart like this obscures—whether deliber-
ately or inadvertently—the fact that only one meeting was ever held
between Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) officials
and the Summit Lake Tribal Council, and the fact that that meeting
was to describe the proposed project to the Tribe, not to gather
information about the Tribe’s specific concerns.221
This anecdote is representative of many federal-tribal consulta-
tions. Faced with similar facts, the Court in Quechan Tribe of the Fort
Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. Department of the Interior admonished
the BLM, claiming that “the sheer volume of documents” cited to
support the agency’s claims that consultation had occurred “is not
meaningful.”222 After reviewing the record, the Court concluded
that the invitation to consult on a solar project that could damage
or destroy more than 350 archeological sites amounted to “little
more than a general request for the Tribe to gather its own infor-
mation about all sites with the area and disclose it at public meet-
ings.”223 The Court concluded that this was not the type of
government-to-government consultation contemplated by the
NHPA.224
As this discussion highlights, agencies that craft consultation poli-
cies could benefit from spending additional time considering how
consultation is defined. Notice and the initial provision of informa-
tion about an agency’s proposed project or regulation are essential
to beginning the consultation process. But genuine consultation
only occurs afterward, when Indian tribes are given the opportunity
to indicate how that proposal will impact their communities and
discuss with federal officials how the proposal might be revised to
eliminate or mitigate those impacts.
219. See supra note 217. R
220. See id.
221. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 21 & n.2, Summit Lake Paiute Tribe v. U.S. Bureau of
Land Mgmt., No. 10-72762 (9th Cir. June 20, 2011), 2011 WL 2532829, at *21 & n.2
222. 755 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1112–18 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
223. Id. at 1118.
224. Id. at 1119.
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2. With Whom Must Consultation Occur?
Statutes, regulations, and policies nearly always require tribal
consultation to be conducted in a “government-to-government”
manner, but few explain what this phrase means.225 At a minimum,
this term should suggest that a meeting between private contractors
and Indian tribes, without the presence of federal officials, does not
constitute consultation. Similarly, a meeting with pan-Indian orga-
nizations, although useful, cannot substitute for government-to-gov-
ernment consultation without the express consent of the tribe in
question. Consultation must occur between federal officials and
tribal officials. These two parties, however, often disagree about
which officials should be included in a consultation session.
Indian tribes usually seek consultation sessions with high-ranking
federal officials because the tribe is typically represented at these
sessions by its highest elected officials (i.e., its president or tribal
council). Consultation with high-ranking federal officials ensures
that the person charged with making the decision respecting a fed-
eral action has been provided direct information about tribal con-
cerns without having that information filtered, perhaps incorrectly
or ineffectively, through another agency employee. In addition,
participation by senior-level federal employees has the important
effect of symbolically communicating to tribes that their concerns
are being taken seriously.
The federal government, on the other hand, often designates
low-ranking federal employees to attend consultation sessions.226
High-ranking officials have many pressing issues to address, and
federal-tribal consultations can be time consuming. Additionally,
high-ranking officials may not be as familiar with the details of the
project or regulation in question. As a result, no existing consulta-
tion policy commits a federal agency to ensuring that consultation
sessions include agency decision makers.
An example of this disagreement between Indian tribes and the
federal government can be seen in the recent Ruby Pipeline Pro-
ject, where the FERC was considering (and ultimately approved) a
225. See, e.g., Secretarial Order No. 3175, supra note 139, at § 1 (noting that “each bureau R
and office will operate within a government to government relationship with federally recog-
nized Indian tribes”); Clinton Memorandum, supra note 146, at 22,951 (stating that its pur- R
pose is “to ensure that the Federal Government operates within a government-to-government
relationship with federally recognized Native American tribes”).
226. But see National Indian Gaming Commission, Government-to-Government Tribal
Consultation Policy, 69 Fed. Reg. 16,973, 16,979 (Mar. 31, 2004) (noting that “[t]he Chair-
man of the NIGC or his or her designee is the principal point of contact for consultation with
Indian tribes,” and that “[t]he NIGC will strive to provide adequate opportunity for affected
tribes to interact directly with the Commission”).
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private party’s application to build an underground natural gas
pipeline through several western states. The Summit Lake Paiute
Tribe of Nevada was concerned about the pipeline’s potential im-
pact on its sacred sites, and it requested that consultation meetings
include FERC’s Commissioners.227 Tribal Chairman Warner
Barlese’s letter to the agency in August 2008 stated: “You may have
your senior administrative person contact our senior administrative
person . . . however, on a government-to-government level, the
Council expects the Commissioners to deal directly with Council
members.”228 FERC rejected this approach, claiming in a response
letter that it was more appropriate for the staff environmental pro-
ject manager and the staff archaeologist to represent the Commis-
sion in meetings with the Tribe.229
Few court decisions have addressed this issue. In Lower Brule, the
U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota indicated that
consultation must occur “with the decision maker or with in-
termediaries with clear authority to present tribal views to the . . .
decision maker.”230 The court did not elaborate on what it meant by
the latter phrase. In the more recent Quechan Tribe, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California noted that “meetings
with government staff or contracted investigators,” such as the Bu-
reau of Land Management’s (BLM) staff archaeologist, are helpful
but do not satisfy the government’s consultation duty.231 The Court
indicated, without explanation, that consultation should instead
have occurred between the tribe and the BLM field manager.232 No
consensus has developed on this point.
A handful of agencies appear to have drafted policies or action
plans following the Obama Memorandum that might offer an effec-
tive middle ground on these issues. The Department of Justice’s
draft tribal consultation policy acknowledges that “[t]o be meaning-
ful, a consultation must involve individuals who have decision
227. See Letter from Warner Barlese, Chairman, Summit Lake Paiute Tribe, to Joseph T.
Kelliher, Chairman, FERC (Aug. 16, 2008) (on file with author).
228. See id.
229. Letter from Patricia A. Schaub, Acting Dir., Office of External Affairs, FERC, to
Warner Barlese, Chairman, Summit Lake Paiute Tribe (Sept. 25, 2008) (on file with author).
230. Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Deer, 911 F. Supp. 395, 401 (D.S.D. 1995).
231. Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 755 F.
Supp. 2d 1104, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
232. Id. (“No letters from the BLM ever initate[d] government-to-government contact
between the Tribe and the United States [or] BLM field managers.”).
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making authority on the issue that is the subject of the consulta-
tion.”233 As a result, the policy calls for the officials to “ensure that
political leadership or other relevant decision makers are substan-
tively involved in the consultation.”234 If those persons are unable to
attend an individual consultation session, the Department’s repre-
sentatives are directed to both consult the decision-makers in ad-
vance of the consultation and apprise them of tribal input after the
consultation session has occurred.235
The definition of “consultation” within the Department of Agri-
culture’s (USDA) tribal consultation action plan presupposes se-
nior-level participation.236 The plan explains that consultation
occurs when agency leaders “at the most senior[ ]level” and a tribal
Chair, President, or leader “formally meet or exchange written cor-
respondence to discuss issues concerning either party.”237 The
USDA plan also emphasizes the need for consistency and proper
coordination in consultation processes through the creation of the
Office of Tribal Relations (OTR) as the “single point of contact” for
all tribal consultation issues.238 Subagencies will identify a single
point of contact for tribal consultation that will regularly report to
the OTR.239 In theory, this will ensure greater consistency in consul-
tation procedures, encourage increased coordination between
tribes and the USDA, and allow tribal leaders to develop relation-
ships with the USDA that will promote more meaningful and
effective government-to-government consultations.
While a few agencies have adopted approaches similar to that of
the Departments of Justice and Agriculture,240 the vast majority still
permit agency employees without decision-making authority to han-
dle consultation sessions with Indian tribes.
233. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRAFT TRIBAL CONSULTATION POLICY 3 (undated) [hereinafter
DOJ DRAFT CONSULTATION POLICY], available at http://www.justice.gov/otj/pdf/tribal-
consultation-policy.pdf.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. USDA ACTION PLAN, supra note 214, at 14. R
237. Id.
238. Id. at 18.
239. Id. at 19.
240. See, e.g., ACF Consultation Policy, supra note 200, at 55,685 (stating that consulting R
parties for the agency will be the assistant secretary, deputy assistant secretaries, central offi-
cial principals, or a designee authorized to negotiate on their behalf); DOI DRAFT CONSULTA-
TION POLICY, supra note 214 (consultation will include Department officials who “are R
knowledgeable about the matters at hand, are authorized to speak for Interior, and have
decision-making authority in the disposition and implementation of a policy or are a pro-
gram manager or staff who can ensure that Tribal concerns will be brought forward to final
decision makers in the event that the decision makers are not present at the consultation
meeting”).
33129-m
re_46-2 S
heet N
o. 62 S
ide A
      03/21/2013   10:43:50
33129-mre_46-2 Sheet No. 62 Side A      03/21/2013   10:43:50
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MRE\46-2\MRE202.txt unknown Seq: 45 18-MAR-13 12:34
WINTER 2013] Toward Genuine Tribal Consultation 461
3. When Should Consultation Occur?
Consultation cannot take place until agency officials have devel-
oped a concrete proposal. On the other hand, for consultation to
be meaningful, it must occur early enough in the planning or draft-
ing process that tribal views can be adequately considered.241 To
date, federal officials have often failed to find the middle ground
that protects them from consulting before an idea has been fully
formed, yet still provides Indian tribes with meaningful opportuni-
ties to shape the proposal. For example, a recent study of the con-
sultation process conducted under the NHPA concluded that many
consultation sessions were, in fact, merely opportunities for
agencies to inform Indian tribes of decisions that had already been
made.242
Timing concerns are usually not a problem of policy but rather
of its implementation. There are, however, a few notable excep-
tions. For example, the new consultation policy of the Department
of Veterans Affairs admits that consultation “is most effective and
meaningful when conducted before taking actions” that impact In-
dian tribes and their members.243 But the Department also claims
that consulting prior to taking action is “a best case scenario,” and
that, in many cases, consultation will need to be initiated as soon as
possible after the action has been taken.244
Conversely, the Department of the Interior’s new draft policy
promises early consultation with tribes. In particular, it states that
the Department will commence consultation “when possible” at the
initial planning stage.245 More specifically, consultation on a federal
project will begin at the scoping stage under NEPA. In other cases,
consultation will begin when the agency is preparing draft regula-
tions, administration proposals, legislation, or changes to proce-
dures or policies.246 Other agencies have included similar
241. See Kevin K. Washburn, Felix Cohen, Anti-Semitism and American Indian Law, 33 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 583, 590 (2009) (reviewing DALIA TSUK MITCHELL, ARCHITECT OF JUSTICE: FE-
LIX S. COHEN AND THE FOUNDING OF AMERICAN LEGAL PLURALISM (2007)) (federal officials
“should consult informally as an idea develops, and should consult widely before an idea
becomes firmly rooted, [but they] must have some limited and protected space in which they
can think about their responsibilities and how to meet them”).
242. SHERRY HUTT & JAIME LAVALLEE, NAT’L ASS’N OF TRIBAL HISTORIC PRES. OFFICERS,
TRIBAL CONSULTATION: BEST PRACTICES IN HISTORIC PRESERVATION 5 (2005), available at http:/
/www.nps.gov/history/thpo/downloads/NATHPO_Best%20Practices.pdf.
243. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, TRIBAL CONSULTATION POLICY 7(b) (2011), available at
http://www.va.gov/TRIBALGOVERNMENT/docs/consultation_policy.pdf.
244. Id.
245. DOI DRAFT CONSULTATION POLICY, supra note 214, at VIII(A) & (D)(1). R
246. See id. at VIII(D)(1).
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provisions in their new consultation policies,247 but application re-
mains uneven.
4. How Will the Tribe Be Informed of Consultation Sessions?
A proper consultation policy should also discuss how tribes will
be notified of the opportunity for consultation. Any notice should
provide information about the proposed action that is sufficient to
enable tribal officials to prepare for the consultation session. Unfor-
tunately, a recent study concluded that many “[a]gencies believed
that consultation obligations could be met by sending a letter to
Tribes inviting them to a consultation without first providing spe-
cific information about the proposed project upon which they
could be prepared to comment.”248
Policies that were adopted in response to Obama’s Memoran-
dum attempt to correct this problem. The Department of the Inte-
rior’s policy requires that notice include “a description of the
topic(s) to be discussed . . . [in] sufficient detail . . . to allow Tribal
leaders an opportunity to fully engage in the consultation.”249 The
USDA’s action plan states that “all parties will be provided with ade-
quate background information so that all may be . . . informed and
so that the resulting consultation may be maximally effective and
beneficial.”250 The agency should also provide enough notice of any
upcoming consultation sessions to ensure that there is a reasonable
opportunity for the tribe to be represented. Many of the new poli-
cies promise to provide between thirty and sixty days’notice to In-
dian tribes prior to the scheduling of any consultation session.251
247. The ACF consultation policy provides that the right to consultation is triggered
whenever the agency is considering a legislative proposal, new rule, or policy change that
either ACF or a tribe determines may significantly affect one or more Indian tribes. It pro-
vides that “[t]o the extent practicable and permitted by law,” the agency shall not take any
action that has tribal implications unless it has “[c]onsulted with tribal officials early and
throughout the process of developing the proposed regulation.” ACF Consultation Policy,
supra note 200, at 55,686. R
248. HUTT & LAVALLEE, supra note 242, at 5. R
249. DOI DRAFT CONSULTATION POLICY, supra note 214, at VIII Consultation Guidelines. R
250. USDA Action Plan, supra note 198, at 15.
251. See, e.g., ACF Consultation Policy, supra note 185, at 55,686 (noting that the Agency R
“will provide at least” 30 days’ notice to tribal officials prior to any consultation session); DOI
Draft Consultation Policy, supra note 199, at VIII(A) (the Department “will strive to ensure that R
a notice is given at least 30 days prior to a scheduled consultation” and if it does not, an
explanation of the exceptional circumstances precluding such notice will appear in the invi-
tation letter); AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, TRIBAL CONSULTATION POLICY
(undated) (the Agency will send at least two written notifications to the potentially affected
tribes—“one at least 45–60 days prior to the consultation” session, and another 15–30 days
prior to the consultation), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/about/tribalplan.htm.
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C. Lack of Uniformity and Volume of Consultations
Another flaw in the current consultation system is that there are
dozens of different statutes, regulations, executive orders, and in-
formal agency policies that deal with tribal consultation. Assem-
bling all of these authorities is a Herculean task, especially
considering that many Indian tribes have limited resources. There
are substantial differences between these policies, which can lead to
misunderstandings and frustration for tribes that are forced to
learn how each agency approaches this component of the federal
trust responsibility.
Indian tribes are also overwhelmed by the number of consulta-
tion requests that they receive from federal agencies. When Con-
gress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in 2009,
it provided more than seven billion dollars to the Departments of
Commerce and Agriculture to expand access to broadband services
throughout the nation.252 The two Departments received more than
two thousand applications requesting funding, which was required
to be disbursed before September 30, 2010.253 Many of these
projects had the potential to impact traditional religious and
cultural properties that were eligible for listing on the National
Register. The federal government had a duty to consult with Indian
tribes who could be affected, but because of tight deadlines, consul-
tation was occurring simultaneously on these projects. At the same
time that these consultations were occurring, every federal agency
began crafting a consultation plan pursuant to Obama’s Memoran-
dum, for which they were seeking input from tribes. This illustrates
how burdensome consultation can be in practice, particularly for
small tribes with little to no resources. When a heavy volume of re-
quests is combined with the often dissatisfying nature of the consul-
tation process, many tribes simply opt out of this right.
252. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, Titles I & II,
123 Stat. 115, 118, 128 (2009) (codified throughout scattered sections of 1, 6, 15, 19, 20, 26,
29, 31, 38, 42, and 47 U.S.C.) (appropriating $2.5 billion to the Rural Utilities Service and
$4.7 billion to the National Telecommunications & Information Administration, respectively,
for broadband development).
253. NAT’L CONG. OF AMERICAN INDIANS [NCAI], ADVANCING CONSULTATION REGARDING
TRIBAL SECTION 106 CONCERNS IN THE ARRA BROADBAND PROGRAMS, RES. NO. PSP-09-087C
(Oct. 11–16, 2009).
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D. Enforceability Issues for Substantive Rights
Problems with the procedural right to federal-tribal consultation
are further exacerbated because there are difficulties in enforcing
the substantive components of the trust responsibility. First, while
the federal government has a duty to provide services to tribal
members, there are significant roadblocks to enforcing this com-
mon law obligation. In Lincoln v. Vigil, the Supreme Court heard a
challenge to the BIA’s decision to discontinue a program that pro-
vided diagnostic and treatment services to Indian children with cog-
nitive impairments, mental illness, and physical disabilities in the
southwestern United States.254 The Court held that this decision was
not reviewable under the APA because it was “committed to agency
discretion by law.”255
The money used to fund this program came from a lump-sum
congressional appropriation and was expended under the authority
of the Snyder Act and the Indian Health Care Improvement Act.256
These acts provide only general guidance to the BIA, requiring, for
example, that money be expended for the “relief of distress and
conservation of [Indian] health.”257 In this case, the BIA was redi-
recting money spent on the preexisting program to mental health-
care for Indian children nationwide, and was therefore using the
funds to meet permissible statutory objectives. Under these
circumstances, the Court said that it could not intervene.258 Conse-
quently, it is up to Congress to decide the contours of the trust
responsibility’s duty to provide services. Courts cannot compel the
appropriation of additional monies, and because Congress typically
makes lump-sum appropriations to the BIA to provide services, the
254. 508 U.S. 182, 189 (1993).
255. Id. at 190–91, 193 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)).
256. Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 185.
257. 25 U.S.C. § 13 (2006).
258. Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 194–95. Similarly, in Hammitte v. Leavitt, a class action lawsuit was
filed on behalf of Indians residing in or near Detroit, Michigan. No. 06-11655, 2007 WL
3013267, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 11, 2007). The plaintiffs claimed that although two-thirds of
tribal members currently live in urban areas such as Detroit, the BIA allocates just 1 percent
of its health care budget to urban areas. Id. at *3. As a result, the plaintiffs were not getting
the medical care they were entitled to under the trust responsibility. The Court rejected this
argument. After distinguishing the cases cited by the plaintiffs, the Court stated that there
was no support
for the broad proposition that the [Indian Health Service] must fund specific health
care services for specific Native American groups on the basis of a “free standing trust
obligation.” To the contrary, Lincoln, rejects such a notion . . . [and] Lincoln makes
clear that lump-sum appropriations are not reviewable.
Id. at *6.
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BIA’s allocation of those appropriations are not reviewable under
the APA.
Second, while the federal government has a duty to protect tribal
resources, the Supreme Court has limited the availability of money
damages for government mismanagement to cases where the fed-
eral government has complete control over the resources in ques-
tion.259 Additionally, as previously discussed in Section III(A), lower
federal courts have confused these Supreme Court decisions
regarding money damages (which are based on the limited waiver
of sovereign immunity that appears in the Indian Tucker Act) with
claims for declaratory or injunctive relief. As a result, courts have
concluded either that suits cannot be brought to prospectively pro-
tect tribal resources in cases where the federal government lacks
complete control over those resources, or that the federal govern-
ment has fulfilled its trust responsibility whenever it has complied
with all statutory obligations.260
Finally, with our burgeoning administrative state, the duty to pro-
tect tribal sovereignty is more relevant than ever. The Federal Register
is replete with proposals for new federal regulations that have the
potential to reach into Indian country and interfere with tribal sov-
ereignty. Even though the trust responsibility requires federal offi-
cials to protect tribal sovereignty, agencies are attempting to
enforce general federal laws (e.g., the National Labor Relations Act
and the Fair Labor Standards Act) and their implementing regula-
tions against tribes. Many lower federal courts have upheld these
intrusions on tribal sovereignty without even mentioning the trust
responsibility.261
Failure to enforce the substantive components of the trust re-
sponsibility means that even when tribal suggestions and requests
259. United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo I), 537 U.S. 488, 508 (2003) (“[H]ere, the
[Indian Mineral Leasing Act] and its regulations do not assign to the Secretary managerial
control over coal leasing.”).
260. See Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 161 F.3d 569, 574
(9th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases).
261. See, e.g., San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1318 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (concluding that the National Labor Relations Act applies to a tribal casino); Fla.
Paraplegic Ass’n, Inc. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126, 1129–30 (11th
Cir. 1999) (holding that the Americans with Disabilities Act is “generally applicable” to In-
dian tribes operating casino and restaurant); Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d
174, 180–81 (2d Cir. 1996) (determining the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act)
applies to tribal business performing construction work on a hotel and casino); Donovan v.
Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying the OSH Act to a
tribal farm); see also Vicki J. Limas, Application of Federal Labor and Employment Statutes to Native
American Tribes: Respecting Sovereignty and Achieving Consistency, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681 (1994).
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are properly solicited, they can be disregarded without the poten-
tial for any recourse. This has led many tribal officials to view con-
sultation as a worthless process that drains tribal manpower and
monetary resources.262
IV. OUR PROPOSAL
Given federal courts’ reluctance to recognize an independent
and enforceable common law duty to federal-tribal consultation,
the only way to guarantee an enforceable tribal consultation right
that applies to all federal agencies is through congressional legisla-
tion. Our proposal for the components of that legislation is de-
scribed in this section.
As an initial matter, it is important to note that if crafted accord-
ing to the priorities described below, a legislative fix would be
mutually beneficial for all stakeholders. All interested parties will
benefit from clear expectations and increased uniformity in consul-
tation procedures. While agencies may at first scoff at the increased
accountability that stems from enforceable consultation processes,
they should be pleased with a decrease in future disagreements be-
tween parties as a result of more meaningful communication and
collaboration at the early stages of projects. Moreover, a legislative
fix will greatly benefit tribes by transforming consultation into a
meaningful legal right. Indeed, the benefits of a clear, uniform leg-
islative fix greatly outweigh any costs.
Until a legislative fix occurs, the President could issue an execu-
tive order that provides guidance to federal agencies about many of
262. The frustration produced by an ineffectual consultation process is demonstrated by
the Timbisha-Shoshone Tribe’s attempts to obtain lands suitable for its first reservation. In
1994, Congress passed the California Desert Protection Act, which included a provision in-
structing the Secretary of the Interior, “in consultation with the . . . Tribe,” to identify suita-
ble lands for their reservation. California Desert Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-433,
§ 705(a), 108 Stat. 4471, 4498 (codified at 16 U.S.C. 410aaa-75 (2006)). In a press release
reflecting on the consultation process that resulted, Acting Tribal Chairperson Pauline Es-
teves stated as follows:
It was one long eleven-month “charade.” Those pasty-faced bureaucrats knew from the
beginning that they would not restore ancestral lands to us. They sat there through
presentation after presentation by the Tribe, fooling us into believing that there could
be a sincere dialogue between the federal government and its constituents. We spent
over a hundred thousand dollars, hiring the best anthropologists, historians, lawyers
and economic consultants, gathering data, establishing the “suitability” of segments of
our traditional homelands proposed to be taken into trust. We made countless pro-
posals. We got nothing of substance back, no effort on their part to even meet us part
way. Instead of dialogue and a respectful exchange of ideas, we were stonewalled.
Haskew, supra note 176, at 60. R
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the issues discussed below. Additionally, to the extent permitted by
law, the President could direct federal agencies to use notice-and-
comment rulemaking in order to turn their policies and handbook
provisions into mandates that are enforceable through judicial re-
view. The likelihood of such a directive having its intended effect,
however, would be based, in part, on whether the executive order
itself contains provisions for enforceability.
A. Enforceability
Congressional legislation that codifies the procedural right to
federal-tribal consultation should explicitly provide for judicial re-
view through a private cause of action for Indian tribes. Lack of
enforceability is currently the biggest obstacle to effective imple-
mentation of tribal consultation. When agency officials are able to
openly refuse to comply with a duty that is acknowledged in numer-
ous executive orders, memoranda, and agency policies, tribal
officials understandably become disillusioned and the federal-tribal
relationship suffers long-term damage.
As discussed above in Part III(D), enforceability concerns perme-
ate all aspects of the trust responsibility; therefore, some scholars
have argued that there must be increased enforcement of the sub-
stantive components of the trust responsibility.263 This would be a
more direct approach. But it would also be considerably more chal-
lenging, as it would require Congress, agency officials, and the
courts to engage in difficult line-drawing exercises.
For example, in New Jersey v. EPA, a group of Indian tribes inter-
vened in litigation pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit.264 That litigation challenged the agency’s decision to
loosen its regulation of mercury emissions from coal- and oil-fired
utility plants.265 Mercury from the atmosphere is deposited in fresh-
water ecosystems through precipitation and transformed into
methylmercury. Methylmercury is highly toxic and rapidly accumu-
lates in the food chain at levels that can cause serious health
concerns for persons who consume fish and seafood.266 Following
the EPA’s regulation, Indian people were at the greatest risk of
263. See generally Wood, supra note 4; Wood, supra note 43. R
264. 663 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
265. New Jersey v. E.P.A., 517 F.3d 574, 577–78 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
266. 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79826–27 (Dec. 20, 2000).
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mercury poisoning because of the large number of tribal members
who engaged in subsistence hunting and fishing.267 Thus, Indian
tribes argued that in allowing increased mercury pollution, the EPA
had violated tribal treaty rights, an argument that could have also
been strengthened by reference to the trust responsibility to protect
tribal resources.268
The D.C. Circuit did not address this issue and overturned the
EPA rule on other grounds.269 Perhaps one of the reasons that the
court declined to decide the question was that it was unsure where
to draw the line. Does the trust responsibility require the agency to
prevent all mercury pollution? It seems unlikely that the courts or
Congress would conclude that the federal trust responsibility auto-
matically trumps all nontribal interests. If the trust responsibility
only requires the agency to prevent some pollution, what is the
amount?
Focusing on aggressive enforcement of the procedural right to
consultation avoids this difficult question. Doing so would be analo-
gous to the approach federal courts have taken in enforcing NEPA.
One of NEPA’s lofty goals is to “prevent or eliminate damage to the
environment.”270 This goal is not accomplished by substantive provi-
sions compelling agencies to adopt the most environmentally
favorable project alternative. Instead, NEPA imposes action-forcing
procedures,271 which require federal agencies to carefully consider
the environmental impacts of and potential alternatives to the pro-
posed project before taking any major federal action.272 These pro-
cedural requirements are then enforceable by private citizens
through lawsuits filed under the APA.273
NEPA’s forty-year history demonstrates that it has been effective
in requiring decision makers to consider environmental conse-
quences before resources are committed; often this leads them to
267. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: METHODOLOGY
USED TO GENERATE DEPOSITION, FISH TISSUE METHYLMERCURY CONCENTRATIONS, AND EXPO-
SURE FOR DETERMINING EFFECTIVENESS OF UTILITY EMISSION CONTROLS 50 (undated), available
at http://www.epa.gov/ttnatw01/utility/eff_fnl_tsd-031705_corr_oar-2002-0056-6301.pdf
268. See generally Final Brief of Petitioners National Congress of American Indians and
Treaty Tribes, New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
269. See New Jersey v. E.P.A., 517 F.3d 574, 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
270. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006).
271. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 527 U.S. 390, 409 & n.18 (1976).
272. Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). The primary means by
which NEPA achieves these goals is through the preparation of environmental impact state-
ments and environmental assessments. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
273. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
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choose more environmentally friendly alternatives.274 For this rea-
son, more than eighty countries have adopted laws based on
NEPA.275 There is no reason to think that a procedural consultation
right enforceable by Indian tribes through judicial proceedings
would not be similarly effective. To ensure that judicial review is
available even for Indian tribes with limited resources, any such leg-
islation should provide that the United States must pay reasonable
attorneys’ fees and other costs if a tribe prevails in its lawsuit.276
Federal officials arguing against an enforceable consultation
right have claimed, however, that it would result in a proliferation
of lawsuits that would cause the government to grind to a halt. We
concede that litigation will initially increase, but if consultation leg-
islation and implementing regulations are properly drafted, litiga-
tion should taper off within a few years. This prediction is once
again supported by experience under NEPA. After NEPA was
enacted, a few years of intense litigation followed. But NEPA
quickly became a mature and predictable program, and lawsuits be-
gan to decline by 1974—just a few years after its enactment.277 Even
though NEPA is currently applied to 50,000–70,000 actions each
year, there are fewer than 150 new NEPA lawsuits filed each year.278
This seems a small price to pay given the gravity of the substantive
rights affected.
B. Alleviating Timing Concerns for Federal Projects
In practice, timing is one of the biggest obstacles to meaningful
consultation between federal agencies and Indian tribes. This is
particularly true when a project is being proposed by a private party
but requires federal approval to move forward. The private party
often has outside time constraints that necessitate a decision about
its application by a specific date. If meaningful consultation does
not occur very early in the project planning stages, it is often too
late to either keep the outside deadline or to adjust the project to
274. See e.g., JAN. G. LAITOS, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 119 (2002); Larry Canter & Ray
Clark, NEPA Effectiveness—A Survey of Academics, 17 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 313
(1997); COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF
ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS (1997) [hereinafter NEPA EFFECTIVENESS].
275. NEPA EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 274, at 3. R
276. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 470w-4 (2006) (permitting award of reasonable attorneys’ fees
and other costs for private suits brought to enforce provisions of the NHPA).
277. Jay E. Austin et al., Judging NEPA: A “Hard Look” at Judicial Decision Making Under the
National Environmental Policy Act, ENVTL. LAW INST. 6 (undated).
278. Considering NEPA: Comments to the National Environmental Policy Act Task Force, ENVTL.
LAW INST. 8 (2006).
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comport with tribal input. Tribes are, more often than not, the
losers in this scenario.
In the Ruby Pipeline Project, for example, the company had
signed contracts with shipping companies, promising them that the
pipeline would be in service by the spring of 2011.279 The federal
government allowed its environmental and cultural resources re-
view process under NEPA and the NHPA to be driven by these con-
tractual deadlines. As a result, alternative routes for the pipeline
were dismissed before tribal consultation even began, and the route
ultimately selected ran directly through hundreds of sites eligible
for listing on the National Register of Historic Places, including an
important traditional religious and cultural property for the Sum-
mit Lake Paiute Tribe.280 These sites may have been preserved had
consultation begun sooner.
One way to ensure that a tribe is consulted early in the planning
stage is to have that tribe serve as a cooperating agency under
NEPA. Cooperating agencies help to develop information and pre-
pare analyses for environmental assessments or environmental im-
pact statements.281 Thus, these agencies “[p]articipate in the NEPA
process at the earliest possible time,” which at a minimum must
include the scoping process.282
The Council on Environmental Quality’s (CEQ) regulations per-
mit Indian tribes to become cooperating agencies when the pro-
ject’s “effects are on a reservation” and the lead agency agrees.283
Unfortunately, the lead federal agency rarely agrees to allow Indian
tribes to become cooperating agencies. In 1999, the CEQ released a
memorandum urging federal agencies to more actively solicit the
participation of state, tribal, and local governments as cooperating
279. See Opening Brief of Petitioner at 22–35, Summit Lake Paiute Tribe v. U.S. Bureau
of Land Mgmt., No. 10-72762 (9th Cir. 2010).
280. See id. Similarly, in Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, the project proponent sought to install thirty thousand solar collectors on federal
lands in California. 755 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1107 (S.D. Cal. 2010). To obtain stimulus funds
under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, construction needed to begin
by the end of 2010. Id. at 1119. The time pressure resulted in the project proponent selecting
a site that contained more than 450 cultural resources, as well as burial sites, ancient trails,
and religious sites. Id. at 1114 n.5, 1119.
281. See sources cited supra note 272. R
282. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6 (2011).
283. Id. § 1508.5. On the other hand, federal and state agencies can become cooperating
agencies if they have jurisdiction over the project or special expertise with respect to any
environmental impact involved in the project, so long as the lead federal agency agrees. Id.;
see also id. § 1501.6.
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agencies in the NEPA process.284 Agency practice did not change,
however, and the CEQ issued two more memoranda on this subject
in 2002.285
Despite these CEQ statements, Indian tribes are still not asked to
serve as cooperating parties. Without a seat at the table, it is easy to
see why competing concerns voiced directly by agency officials are
often given priority over tribal concerns. Congress can correct this
problem by requiring that Indian tribes be invited to participate as
cooperating agencies. Tribes should be invited not only if the pro-
ject may significantly impact their reservations but also if a project
may impact off-reservation resources such as subsistence hunting
and fishing and historic, religious, or cultural sites.
Lack of monetary resources should not prevent Indian tribes
from serving as cooperating agencies. Federal agencies are able to
recover their costs from private parties who are seeking federal li-
censes or permits to build their projects.286 Congress should make it
clear that Indian tribes are also entitled to cost recovery in these
situations.
Of course, not all tribes will have the desire, or the expertise, to
serve as cooperating agencies. Therefore, another approach is nec-
essary to ensure that tribal concerns are voiced and understood
early in the project planning process. Any statute must require that
tribes be notified and asked to consult on projects prior to NEPA’s
scoping stage and at least as soon as any governor, state agency, and
local government is asked to participate.
284. See GEORGE T. FRAMPTON, JR., ACTING CHAIR, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MEMORANDUM TO THE HEADS OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 1 (1999) (re-
garding “Designation of Non-Federal Agencies to be Cooperating Agencies in Implementing
the Procedural Requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act”), available at http://
ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/ceqcoop.pdf.
285. In January 2002, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) issued a memoran-
dum stating the benefits of including Indian tribes as cooperating agencies, which included:
“disclosing relevant information early in the analytical process; applying available technical
expertise and staff support; avoiding duplication with . . . Tribal . . . procedures; and estab-
lishing a mechanism for addressing intergovernmental issues.” JAMES CONNAUGHTON, CHAIR,
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MEMORANDUM TO THE HEADS
OF FEDERAL AGENCIES (2002) (regarding “Cooperating Agencies in Implementing the Proce-
dural Requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act”), available at http://ceq.hss.
doe.gov/nepa/regs/cooperating/cooperatingagenciesmemorandum.html. The next month,
the CEQ provided a similar memo to tribal leaders assuring them that the CEQ supports
their involvement and encourages them to “consider accepting or requesting an invitation to
participate in the NEPA process as a cooperating agency.” JAMES CONNAUGHTON, CHAIR,
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MEMORANDUM TO TRIBAL LEAD-
ERS (2002) (regarding “Cooperating Agencies in Implementing the Procedural Require-
ments of the National Environmental Policy Act”).
286. 43 U.S.C. § 1734 (2006).
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That alone may not be enough in some circumstances. If a pro-
ject has the potential to impact tribal cultural and religious sites, for
example, tribal members may be reluctant to disclose information
about the location or use of such sites. This reluctance may exist
because (1) it is culturally impermissible to share such
information,287 (2) there is mistrust of the federal government, or
(3) concerns exist among the tribe about whether the information
will be made available to the public, which could result in looting
or non-Indians misappropriating Indian religious beliefs.288 When
the lead federal agency has had little contact with the tribe in the
past, tribal members may be even more cautious.
It may be possible to overcome these obstacles and obtain the
necessary information early in the planning process if at least one
of the federal officials who elicits information from the tribe has
interacted extensively with the tribe’s elected leadership in the past
and has acquired knowledge about the tribe’s history and culture.
One way to ensure the availability of such an official would be
through the use of a tribal liaison.
Many agencies presently employ a tribal liaison for the purpose
of consultation with Indian tribes. A recent study of the consulta-
tion process conducted under the National Historic Preservation
Act concluded that “[h]aving a Tribal Liaison is a positive factor in
an efficient and successful consultation.”289 There is still significant
room for improvement, however. Currently, each agency employs
its own tribal liaison. While this person is likely to be much more
generally knowledgeable than other federal officials about Indian
tribes, the tribal liaison may know very little about the tribe involved
in a particular consultation session and may not have previously
met the elected tribal officials with whom he or she is consulting.
A better approach might be to hire tribal liaisons that are housed
within the BIA or the Executive Office of the President. These indi-
viduals would be assigned to geographical regions and be available
for consultation sessions on all federal projects within that region,
287. For example, a common theme among many tribal religions is that speaking about
death, deceased relatives, or the location of burial sites, will hasten one’s own death or bring
disease and destruction to the community. See Ben Daitz, With Poem, Broaching the Topic of
Death, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2011, at D5 (discussing the difficulties inherent in teaching Navajo
people about living wills and do-not-resuscitate orders because “[i]n Navajo culture, talking
about death is thought to bring it about, so it is not discussed”).
288. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCTING TRIBAL CONSULTATION, BLM
MANUAL HANDBOOK H-8120-1, V-1 (2004) (“Particularly where places of religious importance
are involved, tribes may be reluctant to provide specific information, perhaps because it is
culturally impermissible to share such information outside the tribe, or because the appropri-
ateness of BLM’s use and protection of the information are not certain.”).
289. HUTT & LAVALLEE, supra note 242, at 24. R
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regardless of who the lead (or cooperating) federal agency was.
This approach would allow the tribal liaison to build an under-
standing of the history and culture of the tribes in her region and
to interact with tribal officials before a private party files an applica-
tion requesting project approval.
Another advantage of this system would be minimization of the
conflicts of interest that are inherent in the federal trust responsi-
bility.290 Whether enforceable or not, the federal government has
substantive obligations to protect tribal resources and tribal sover-
eignty. The federal officials charged with executing this trust
responsibility, however, also represent the broader interests of the
federal government and its citizens. This conflict is present in the
form of tribal liaisons currently working within federal agencies. If
tribal liaisons were housed within agencies that are not involved in
the project at issue, however, those individuals would be able to sit
at the table with other federal decision makers and better advocate
for a particular tribe’s interests.
C. Specificity and Uniformity
Any consultation statute enacted by Congress should create uni-
form rules that apply to all agencies that take actions implicating a
substantive prong of the trust responsibility. While the statute
should be flexible enough to allow particular tribes and agencies to
negotiate consultation compacts that meet their individual
needs,291 establishing a set of baseline standards that apply to all
agencies absent contrary tribal agreement will simplify the current
system. These standards should include the following:
Identification Stage: The agency should identify activities that may
be appropriate for consultation, considering the full scope of the
federal government’s trust responsibility to Indian tribes. This stage
should include an initial identification of the potentially affected
tribe(s). Agencies, however, may not always realize that a policy
contains tribal implications. For this reason, any statute must also
contain a process that allows Indian tribes to trigger the consulta-
tion duty by identifying federal actions that may impact their re-
sources, sovereignty, or the provision of services.
290. See, e.g., Ann C. Juliano, Conflicted Justice: The Department of Justice’s Conflict of Interest in
Representing Native American Tribes, 37 GA. L. REV. 1307 (2003); Judith V. Royster, Equivocal
Obligations: The Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship and Conflicts of Interest in the Development of Min-
eral Resources, 71 N.D. L. REV. 327 (1995).
291. Gover, supra note 4, at 359–62 (noting the necessity of a customized trust R
relationship).
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Notification Stage: For all matters identified by the agency as trig-
gering the consultation duty, providing notice to the tribes that may
be affected should initiate the consultation process. A posting in
the Federal Register is far from sufficient notice. Many tribes have
minimal resources, and the federal government does not fulfill its
trust responsibility if it requires tribes to expend those resources
scouring the Federal Register on a daily basis. Notice can easily be
accomplished through a letter and telephone call to a tribal leader.
The letter should describe the project proposal in detail that is suf-
ficient to allow tribal officials to formulate their initial impressions
of the proposal and to begin to gather pertinent information. Bar-
ring an emergency, tribes should be provided with at least thirty
days’ notice prior to any consultation session.
Consultation Stage: As discussed above, an agency should begin
consulting with the tribe as early as possible. For federal or federally
approved projects, tribes should be afforded the opportunity to be-
come a full party—for example, through cooperating-party status
under NEPA. Regardless, consultation is not satisfied simply by af-
fording a tribe the opportunity to comment on a draft rule or draft
environmental impact statement; any member of the general public
has this right. Consultation requires a two-way dialogue in which
tribal officials not only present information, but also discuss the
proposal and alternatives to the proposal with federal officials.
Whenever possible, consultation should include federal officials
who have decision-making authority over the project or proposal in
question. Consultation meetings (whether held over the telephone
or in person) should be summarized, and that summary should be
provided to all of the participants. This will not only allow Indian
tribes to clarify any misunderstandings, but it will also create a re-
cord that can be preserved for judicial review. After the agency has
fully considered the tribe’s suggestions, federal officials must re-
spond to those suggestions, explaining which suggestions will be
adopted as well as which ones will not be adopted, and why.
CONCLUSION
The federal government’s trust responsibility includes an impor-
tant procedural component: the duty to consult with Indian tribes.
This consultation duty has the potential to breathe new life into the
substantive components of the trust responsibility. Just as NEPA has
forced federal agencies to consider how their actions may impact
the environment, a robust and enforceable consultation duty would
require agencies to consider whether or not they are fulfilling their
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obligation to provide services to tribal members, to protect tribal
sovereignty from state and federal incursions, and to safeguard tri-
bal resources for future generations.
